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LAND USE REGULATION AND GOOD INTENTIONS
STEVEN J. EAGLE*

This Essay surveys contemporary issues in American land
use regulation. Its central claim is that, despite good intentions,
regulations often have either been ineffective or exacerbated
existing problems. The problems underlying regulation include
contested understandings of private property rights, continual
economic and social change, and a political process prone to ad
hoc deal making. Together, they result in regulation that is
conceptually incoherent and continually provisional.
The Essay briefly reviews how land use philosophy has
changed from early nuisance prevention, through Progressive
Era comprehensive planning, to modern views of regulation as
transactional. It examines our regulatory takings framework for
delineating between private property rights and legitimate
government regulation. The Essay reviews such contentious
issues as affordable housing. Finally, it asserts that, in the
absence of a generally agreed upon understanding of land use
goals, comprehensive grand bargains among factions and
public-private partnerships would facilitate entrenchment and
favoritism. The ensuing uncertainty and lack of housing
opportunities in cities where workers would be most productive
harms individual advancement and the national economy.
Keywords
Land-use planning, zoning, property rights, Progressive
Era, affordable housing, fair housing, housing subsidies,
eminent domain, regulatory takings, transferable development
rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay broadly considers contemporary issues in
American land use regulation. Its central claim is that, despite
good intentions, regulations often have either been ineffective
or exacerbated existing problems. This state of affairs results
from contested understandings regarding the meaning and
importance of private property rights, economic and social
dynamism, and a political process prone to producing general
aspirational statements and ad hoc dealmaking. Together, they
result in regulation that is conceptually incoherent and
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continually provisional. This leads to uncertainty, which
undermines financial and social investment in communities.
As an initial illustration, Americans desire to live in
communities with great economic prosperity, fine natural and
manmade amenities, and low housing prices. Alas, on this vale
of tears any two of those desirable things are available, but not
all three. A common response has been for various interest
groups to declare the states of affairs that they hope to achieve,
and sheath them in terms that others would seem to be
churlish to oppose, such as "affordable housing." 1
The Essay briefly reviews how land use philosophy has
changed from early nuisance prevention, through Progressive
Era comprehensive planning, to modern views of regulation as
transactional. It also examines our legal framework for
delineating the boundary between private property rights and
legitimate government regulation. Finally, it asserts that, in
the absence of a generally agreed upon understanding of land
use goals, suggestions for comprehensive grand bargains
among factions and public-private partnerships would facilitate
entrenchment and favoritism.

IL PROPERTY IN AMERICA
The extent to which property should be regulated by the
State is predicated upon 'Yhether "property" primarily serves
as a shield to protect individual autonomy, for which the
accumulation of property protects against dependence on
government, as well as enhancing many nonpecuniary values. 2
From this perspective, property is a prepolitical right, which
government does not create, but rather protects. 3
In contrast, Progressive Property focuses on property as
entailing responsibilities to society. Professor Gregory
Alexander, thus, refers to "governance property" as a construct
where fragmentary and coincident rights to possess, use, and
transfer assets require the creation of norms to govern

1.
See infra Part IV for discussion of affordable housing issues.
2.
See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, The Symbiosis of Pride & Property
(Jan. 17, 2017) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2891716) (noting that authentic
pride is evolutionarily useful, and may manifest itself through property ownership).
3.
See Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1568 (2003). "Property is a 'natural'-inherent, prepolitical, and
prelegal-right because its pursuit secures a wide range of natural goods [, such as]
self-preservation, the preservation of one's family, and the wealth needed to practice
other virtues that require some minimum of material support." Id.
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relations among interest holders. 4 "The moral foundation of
governance property is human flourishing. This pluralistic
conception of human flourishing means that property serves
multiple values and that these values are incommensurable." 5

A. The Lockean Tradition and Property Rights
After the English Glorious Revolution of 1688, the "new
understanding" was that "ultimate political authority derived
not from the divine right of kings, but from the consent of the
governed." 6 English and Scottish Enlightenment authors were
closely associated with the Glorious Revolution, and the best
known of these to eighteenth-century Americans was John
Locke, whose Second Treatise of Government declaimed, "lives,
liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name,
property." 7
"By the late eighteenth century, 'Lockean' ideas on
government and revolution were accepted everywhere in
America; they seemed, in fact, a statement of principles built
into English constitutional tradition." 8 The prepolitical nature
of property rights 9 was reflected in the Preamble of the
Virginia Constitution, which was drafted by George Mason and
adopted on June 12, 1776. It declared, "All men are born
equally free and independent and have certain inherent and
natural rights ... among which are the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property,
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." 10 The right
to private property was presupposed in the Fifth Amendment

4.
Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PAL. REV. 1853, 1856
(2012).
5.
Id. at 1876-77 (internal citations omitted) (citing as pluralistic values
"personal autonomy, individual security, self-development or self-realization, social
welfare, community and sharing, fairness, friendship, and love.").
6. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1431
(1987).
7. JOHN LoCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §123, at 204 (Peter
Laslett ed., New York: New American Library 1965) (1690).
8.
PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 87 (Vintage Books 1st ed. 1997).
See generally, Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of
9.
Property, 26 VAL.U. L. REV. 367 (1991); See also, Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and
Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017) (focusing on the connection
between human labor and flourishing).
10. PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, June 12, 1776, as reprinted in MAIER, supra note 8,
at 126-27.
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of the United States (U.S.) Constitution, 11 and memorably was
described by Professor James Ely as the "guardian of every
other right." 12

B. Progressive Property and Societal Constraints
In contrast with the Framers' Lockean orientation, the
noted historian Gordon Wood wrote that the revolutionary
American form of Civic Republicanism "meant ... more than
eliminating a king and instituting an elective system of
government; it meant setting forth moral and social goals as
well. Republics required a particular sort of independent,
egalitarian, and virtuous people .... "13
A contemporary manifestation of Civic Republicanism is
progressive property, 14 particularly in its emphasis that
property ownership entails owners' responsibility. 15 Professor
Alexander emphasized that we should reject that property is a
''black box" from which owners deal with outside non-owners
and focus instead on the "internal life" of property; that is to
say, the relationship among its stakeholders. 16
Together with Professors Eduardo Penalver, Joseph
Singer, and Laura Underkuffler, Alexander issued a short
manifesto entitled A Statement of Progressive Property, 17 which
suggested, among other things, that property "implicates plural

11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008).
13. Robert W. Bennett, 0/ Gnarled Pegs and Round Holes: Sunstein's Civic
Republicanism and the American Constitution, ll CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 395
(1994) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)) (quoting
Gordon S. Wood, Republicanism, in Leonard W. Levy, ed., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 448, 449 (Supp I, MacMillan, 1992)).
14. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Property As Propriety, 77 NEB. L. REV. 667
(1998).
Attacking legally-created privileges as un-American was established as a
common theme in political-legal tracts in the revolutionary era, and it
continued to be prominent well into the nineteenth century, especially among
Jacksonians. The Jacksonian interpretation of republicanism emphasized its
democratic possibilities, in contrast with the Federalist-Whig interpretation,
which stressed its belief in social hierarchy and political order.
Id. at 682.
15. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELLL. REV. 745, 747-48 (2009).
16. Alexander, supra note 4, at 1854-55.
17. Gregory S. Alexander, et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 7 43 (2009).
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and incommensurable values," including individual wants and
needs, environmental stewardship and civic responsibility, and
human dignity. 18
Professor Lee Anne Fennell has challenged what she
termed the "fee simple obsolete," which "most plainly gets in
the way" of better reconfiguration and coordination of property
rights. 19 She asserted that reliance on the fee simple as the
predominant ownership vehicle made sense when "temporal
spillovers loom large, interdependence among parcels is low,
most value is produced within the four corners of the property,
and cross-boundary externalities come in forms that
governance strategies can readily reach." 20 Now, however, the
fee simple's "rootedness" and "endlessness" augur for new ways
to reconfigure urban land. 21
III. THE TRADITION AND LAW OF LAND USE PLANNING

A. Planning and Common Law Nuisance

Since its colonial beginnings "land use planning" has grown
from modest regulations akin to protection from common law
nuisance to expert plans attempting to fine-tune the use of
individual parcels for the benefit of society.
A study of Los Angeles, for instance, noted that regulations
began in 1573, when laws promulgated by Philip II of Spain,
"included detailed instructions for the location of 'slaughter
houses, fisheries, tanneries, and other businesses which
produce filth."' 22 In nineteenth-century America, the location of
livery stables was an important urban concern. 23 In modern
times, zoning regulation attenuates such concerns, but does not
eliminate them.24
"Dirty industrial activities in the middle of residential
communities and unsightly and aesthetically offensive
developments such as tanneries and slaughterhouses

Id. at 743.
Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1464 (2016).
Id. at 1457.
Id. at 1489-90.
James M. Anderson, et al., Reducing Crime by Shaping the Built
Environment with Zoning: An Empirical Study of Los Angeles, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 699,
709-10 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
23. E.g., City of Chicago v. Stratton, 44 N.E. 853 (Ill. 1896) (upholding ordinance
requiring that neighbors consent to the siting of a livery stable in a residential block).
24. See, e.g., OLIVER GILLHAM, THE LIMITLESS CITY: A PRIMER ON THE URBAN
SPRAWL DEBATE 16 (2002) ("If you invest in building a house, you don't know for sure
that a tannery or a pulp mill won't get built next door someday.").
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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depressed the values of adjacent business and residential
properties." 25 There are scholars who have emphasized that
colonial experience included broader land use controls, most
notably Professor John Hart. 26 Historical experience was the
subject of an exchange in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council 27 between Justice Antonin Scalia, who alluded to the
apparently Lockean "historical compact recorded in the
Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture," 28 and Justice Harry Blackmun, who countered that
"[i]t is not clear from the Court's opinion where our 'historical
compact' or 'citizens' understanding' comes from, but it does not
appear to be history." 29
Reflecting the owners' affirmative rights of use in
common and natural law, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 30 declared that
"the right to build on one's own property-even though
its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting
requirements~annot
remotely
be
described
as
a
'government benefit."' 31 In recently quoting this language in
Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 32 the Court made clear
that the Fifth Amendment's protection against uncompensated
takings is as applicable to personal property as to real
property. 33
Public nuisance was closely associated with modern
comprehensive land use regulation from the beginning. In the
seminal case upholding zoning, Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 34 the Supreme Court noted that, "[i]n solving
doubts, the maxim 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,' which
lies at the foundation of so much of the common l[a]w of

25. Barbara Clark, An Expanded Role for the State in Regional Land Use
Control, 70 CAL. L. REV. 151, 177 n.14 (1982).
26. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996) (asserting greater regulation than
now generally assumed).
27. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
28. Id. at 1028.
29. Id. at 1055--56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
31. Id. at 835 n.2.
32. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
33. Id. at 2430--31 (distinguishing Ruckelshaus u. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986
(1984). In Monsanto, the mandatory disclosure of trade secrets was upheld, because the
case involved "dangerous chemicals," whereas the raisins at issue in Horne were a
"healthy snack." Id.
34. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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nuisance, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew." 35 More
recently, in Lucas, 36 the Court declared, with reference to
"regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of
land," that "[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly
legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere
in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon
land ownership." 37 However, Justice Scalia's attempt in Lucas
to devise a bright line rule was not successful, and, perhaps
confounding his expectations, the principal role of the case
has been to fortify municipalities' argument that stringent
regulations are based on background principles. 38

B. The Rise of Comprehensive Planning
While public land use planning in America has some earlier
antecedents, 39 modern planning regulation began with
New York City's comprehensive ordinance in 1916. 40 The
Department of Commerce promulgated its model Standard
Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) in 1928. 41 The Act was extremely
successful and serves as a basis for state enabling laws in all
50 states. 42 Section 3 of SZEA required that zoning ordinances
be drafted "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." 43 In a
landmark article, 44 Professor Charles Haar discussed that the
"comprehensive plan" requirement appeared to be a "directive
to put zoning on a base broader than and beyond itself ...."45

Id. at 387 (stating the maxim "the use of one's property should be limited so
injure that of another").
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1029.
See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321
(2005).
39. See generally JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND
USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW (3d ed. 2013).
40. Id. at 41.
41. ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE
ZONING ENABLING ACT, S. Doc. No. 13-29 (1926) [hereinafter SZEA], https://planningorguploadedmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/legacy_resources/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnabling
Act1926.pdf.
42. See Gary D. Taylor & Mark A. Wyckoff, Intergovernmental Zoning Conflicts
Over Public Facilities Siting: A Model Framework for Standard State Acts, 41 URB.
LAW. 653, 683 (2009).
43. SZEA, supra note 41, § 3, at 6-7. Under §3 of the Standard Act, zoning was
required to be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."
44. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 1154 (1955).
45. Id. at 1156.
35.
as not to
36.
37.
38.
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Given that the comprehensive plan was the vehicle that
associated the police power of the State with the details of
local regulations, Haar subsequently referred to it as the
"impermanent constitution" against which courts would
measure disputed regulations. 46
"A nuisance," Justice George Sutherland declared in
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 47 "may be merely a right thing in
the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard." 48 Thus, zoning was, at least in large measure, an
attempt to assign incompatible land uses to different
geographical areas.
Professor Haar stressed that "by [the comprehensive plan's]
requirement of information gathering and analysis, controls
are based on facts, not haphazard surmises-hence their moral
and consequent legal basis; by its comprehensiveness,
diminished are the problems of discrimination, granting of
special privileges, and the denial of equal protection of the
laws." 49 Another important proponent of the importance of the
comprehensive plan was Professor Daniel Mandelker, who
detailed why and how it should be implemented. 50
State courts have interpreted the comprehensive planning
requirement in different ways. A few continue to state that the
comprehensive plan is to be found in the zoning ordinances and
maps; the trend has been that the existence of a separate plan
is at least a factor in judicial deference to zoning regulations,
and in a few states there is a mandate for a separate
comprehensive plan. 51 All of this recently led Professor
Mandelker to note that in recent decades courts have
considered spot zoning cases using "nebulous rules applied on
an erratic basis." 52 ''Wealth transfer and capture by developer
or neighbor interests can occur," he added, and multifactor
tests generally have been "not helpful." 53 Reiterating his earlier

46. Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 353, 365--66 (1955).

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 388.
Harr, supra note 46, at 365--66.
See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan
in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L.REV. 899 (1976).
51. See Edward J. Sullivan & Jennifer Bragar, Recent Developments in
Comprehensive Planning, 46 URB. LAW. 685, 687-97 (2014).
52. Daniel R. Mandelker, Spot Zoning: New Ideas for an Old Problem 48 URB.
47.
48.
49.
50.

LAW. 737, 782-83 (2016).

53. Id. at 782.
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view, Mandelker concluded: "Consistency with a comprehensive
plan, as the only test for spot zoning, addresses these
concerns." 54
1. Expert Decision Makers in the Progressive Tradition

The rise of comprehensive zoning very much is part of the
broader story of the Progressive Era in which professionalism
came of age. 55 Professionalism "thrived in a time in which
science and expertise occupied an exalted position in the
collective imagination," and in which "government and society
in general turned to the well-trained expert to help
preserve fairness, justice, and progress in an increasingly
complex industrial world." 56 Professor Michael Allen Wolf
described zoning as a "quintessential Progressive concept,"
because it relied on experts to design and enforce regulations
that would create a more pleasant environment that, in turn,
would "foster healthy, responsible citizens[.]" 57
Notably, Professor Bruce Ackerman wrote 40 years ago of
"Scientific Policymakers" who would apply expert regulation in
allocating rights in things among claimants, 58 as opposed to
addressing the ownership of things from a more foundational
and holistic perspective. 59 This was part and parcel of
Ackerman's more general view of the Progressive Era, which
applauded the "independent and expert administrative agency
creatively regulating a complex social problem in the public
interest." 60
Ackerman's assertions might be viewed as a high-water
mark of faith in expertise. The subsequent decline in the

54. Id. at 783.
55. See LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS
TRANSFORMATIONS, AND ITS PROSPECTS, 484-85 (1961).
56. Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 649,
650 (2016).
57. MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. AMBLER 30
(2008).
58. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1977).
59. See Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32
SEA'ITLE U. L. REV. 617, 619-20 (2009).
60. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HAsSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, OR
How THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGHSULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 1 (1981) ("The rise of
environmental consciousness in the late 1960s coincided with the decline of an older
dream the image of an independent and expert administrative agency creatively
regulating a complex social problem in the public interest.").
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concept of professionalism, 61 and distrust of authority, are
reflected in the recent cultural awareness of the pervasiveness
of "alternative facts" and the concept of a "post truth" society. 62
A more immediately relevant problem is that planners
themselves have lost their belief in long-term planning, and
thus their work now focuses on the shorter-term. 63 The
tendency to focus planning on "how a community might appear
on a specific date far in the future" seemed to crest before 1980,
when "virtually all planning professionals had come to
recognize both the limits of rationality and the unpredictability
of modern civilization . . . . [F]lexible, middle-range planning
has come to replace long-range, end-state planning." 64 This
seems sensible, given that "one thing that is certain about
planning for the future is that the future is uncertain, whether
because of unforeseen shifts in demographics, technological
advancements, natural disasters, or other unpredictable
events." 65 While this turn has made planning more flexible and
pragmatic, it has reduced the stability that encourages
development and lends doubt to regulatory decisions. 66
Shorter time horizons do not necessarily change planners'
normative perspectives. In 1963, one senior planner wrote that
his colleagues regarded low-density development as "inherently
evil," that they "assumeO that the city must have a highdensity core," and that most "express a greater preference for
row houses, garden apartments, and elevator apartments than
for single-family houses." 67 Similarly, "[i]n the early 1990s,
land use planners turned to the concept of 'smart growth' to
help control the impacts of urban sprawl." 68

61. Roiphe, supra note 56, at 650 ("Professionalism was a casualty of the 1970s.
It was lost in the shuffle as the culture shifted from one that emphasized the
importance of the social and the value of a carefully coordinated national community to
one that focused on the power of the individual and smaller more parochial groups.").
62. See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting
the Challenge, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 137-38 (2017). [However], "social
scientists from a variety of fields, most notably political science and psychology, have
long been interested in how and why individuals and institutions adopt behaviors or
beliefs that are patently at odds with observable reality." Id.
63. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
69--70 (4th ed. 2013).
64. Id.
65. Richard K. Norton, Who Decides, How, and Why? Planning for the Judicial
Review of Local Legislative Zoning Decisions, 43 URB. LAW. 1085, 1090 (2011)
66. Id.
67. William L.C. Wheaton, Operations Research for Metropolitan Planning, 29 J.
AM. INST. PLANNERS 250, 254-55 (1963), http:/ldx.doi.org/10.1080/01944366308978074.
68. Francesca Ortiz, Biodiversity, the City, and Sprawl, 82 B.U. L. REV. 145, 177
(2002).
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While the strong policy preferences of many planners
might yield to a pragmatic, short-term application of planning
principles, they might be susceptible to weariness, or even
cynicism. Professor Carol Rose has noted:
Land use issues might to some degree be regarded as
specialized matters, but on closer examination their
specialized quality evaporates. It is true that local
governments are advised by planning commissions, but
the commissioners are normally ordinary citizens with
no special expertise. Planning commission advisory
staffs are professionals, but even professional planners
have come to see their tasks as more political than
technical. 69
2. Regulation Expands Beyond Nuisance-Like Activity
The Supreme Court's emphasis in Euclid was that zoning
could be viewed as a prophylactic, such as for prevention of
contagious disease, as opposed to literal nuisance regulation. 70
Many subsequent cases have gone further, however, and have
used zoning to fine tune the municipal tax base, 71 or the
socioeconomic composition of neighborhoods. 72
Low-density land use often is pejoratively labeled as
"sprawl," and higher-density uses often are labeled as "smart
growth." Dean Janice Griffith encapsulated that view:
Many people in the United States prefer living in a
rural environment with low density. They will keep
moving farther and farther out from the central city
when further development engulfs their suburban

69. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls As Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 868--69 (1983).
70. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926). "[T]he law
of nuisance[s] ... may be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the
helpful aid of its analogies" as to "excludeO from residential sections ... structures
likely to create nuisances." Id. (emphasis added).
71. See, e.g., 99 Cents Stores Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,
237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129--30 (C.D. Cal. 2001), dismissed by 60 F. App'x 123 (9th Cir.
2003) (finding pretextual condemnation to augment municipal tax revenue);
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203,
1209 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (involving church parcel condemned for re-transfer to a big box
store that would generate sales taxes).
72. See, e.g., Chinese Staff and Workers Ass'n v. Bloomberg, 26 Misc. 3d 979, 980
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (holding that the State Environmental Quality Review Act
necessitated a "hard look at the socioeconomic impact" of a proposed luxury high-rise in
a socioeconomically diverse neighborhood).
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residences. North Americans value independence and
freedom from public regulation. Before they are willing
to adopt more compact living, they must come to believe
that the benefits of smart growth outweigh the
detriments of sprawl. Greater density living will not be
palatable until the harms caused by sprawl-congested
highways, air pollution, diminished water quality, and
loss of open space-are viewed as unsolvable without the
use of more smart growth techniques. Thus, even if
planners and lawyers draw up a perfect smart growth
code, political pressures may prevent its adoption or
compromise its administration once adopted. 73
At the same time as he apparently condescended in opmmg
"even the most unenlightened realize [that sprawl] needs
rethinking," Robert Burchell nevertheless described the fruits
of low-density development in what most Americans would
regard as almost rhapsodic terms. 74

IV. FROM TRADITIONAL PLANNING TO "ZONING FOR DOLLARS"
A. Is Planning "Social Engineering"?

For better or worse, the past century of American land use
planning has been marked by "social engineering," 75 a phrase
often used as a pejorative connoting overly-intrusive or
unnecessary regulation. 76 The results often are mixed. The
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), for instance, has been
"one of the most important U.S. housing policy institutions of

73. Janice C. Griffith, Smart Governance for Smart Growth: The Need for
Regional Governments, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (2001).
74. Robert W. Burchell, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the United States,
5 HAsTING W.N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 159-60 (1999). ''It provides safe and
economically heterogeneous neighborhoods that are removed from the problems of the
central city. In low-density, middle-class environments, life is lived with relative ease,
and when residents wish to relocate, they typically leave in better financial conditionthe result of housing appreciation." Id. at 160.
75. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1635 (2003). "Euclid is now understood, in one leading
casebook's characterization, 'as a generous endorsement of social engineering in the
name of public health, safety, and welfare."' Id. (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) and quoting JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 1010 (5th ed. 2002)).
76. See, e.g., Harry W. Richardson & Peter Gordon, The Implications of the
Breaking the Logjam Project for Smart Growth and Urban Land Use, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 529, 543 (2008) (describing as "stunning" the notion that changes in land use
regulation can remedy the obesity problem).
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the 20th and 21st centuries," 77 although for much of its history
it affirmatively furthered racial segregation. 78 Likewise, the
Interstate Highway System was the major impetus to
suburbanization and all it entails. 79
Claims of social engineering have arisen recently as a result
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
promulgation in 2015 of its final rule on "Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing," that establishes the predicate for
much stricter federal enforcement of fair housing laws. 80 Two
weeks earlier, the Supreme Court made it easier to establish
violations of the Fair Housing Act81 in Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project. 82 At that time, Dr. Ben Carson, now Secretary of HUD,
castigated the regulation as social engineering, asserting that
"government-engineered attempts to legislate racial equality
create consequences that often make matters worse. . . .
[B]ased on the history of failed socialist experiments in this
country, entrusting the government to get it right can prove
downright dangerous."83

B. Markets and Land Regulation

In

The Problem of Social Cost, 84 Ronald Coase
demonstrated that in a world without transaction costs the
initial assignment of property rights would not matter, since
rights easily could be acquired and recombined by the person
placing the highest value upon them. 85 His conclusion

77. James H. Carr, The Complex History of the Federal Housing Administration:
Building Wealth, Promoting Segregation, and Rescuing the U.S. Housing Market and
the Economy, 34 BANKING & FIN. SERVS POL'y REP. 10, 10 (Aug. 2015) (noting that the
FHA issued the first government-guaranteed mortgages in the U.S., which were "a
major contributor to both the post-World War II housing boom, particularly in the
suburbs, and accelerated home ownership" (internal citations omitted)).
78. See infra notes 297-299 and accompanying text.
79. See ARTHUR C. NELSON & JAMES B. DUNCAN, GROWTH MANAGEMENT
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 2-5 (1995) (noting that the system opened huge areas of
rural land to development).
80. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015)
(codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 92, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903). See also Steven J. Eagle,
''Affordable Housing" as Metaphor, 44 FORDHAM URB. L. J., 1, 27 (2017).
81. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601--06 (2012).
82. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015) (upholding the use of "disparate impact" as a test
for determining if local housing regulations or actions violate the Fair Housing Act).
83. Ben S. Carson, Experimenting With Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES,
July 23, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamashousingrules-try-to-accomplish-/ [https://perma.cc/KJ3C-49QT].
84. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
85. See id. at 2--8.
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depended upon the crucial assumptions that property rights
were fully specified, and also that the cost of determining the
existing ownership of rights and negotiating, contracting for,
and monitoring their assignment was zero. 86
A key insight of The Problem of Social Cost was that
untoward results often result from the propinquity of land uses
that are separately desirable, but also incompatible, and that
each might be seen as inflicting harm (negative externalities)
upon the other. 87 Professor David Spence observed that, in this
Coasean framework, the "most efficient solution to externality
problems is not regulation but a compensation agreement
produced by private bargaining among the affected parties."88
As noted earlier, 89 the judicial imprimatur for
comprehensive zoning in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 90 was, at
least in large measure, an attempt to assign incompatible land
uses to different geographical areas. However, zoning on a
citywide scale is by its nature too coarse-grained to take into
account preferable uses of individual parcels of land. Thus,
Professor Robert Nelson argued that zoning should be treated
as collective rights of residents of individual neighborhoods. 91
He, 92 and also Professor William Fischel, 93 advocated that
private bargaining could more efficiently achieve goals
embodied in zoning. In City Unplanning, 94 Professor David
Schleicher observed that "[t]he idea that a government planner
should decide the best uses for private real property may seem
like an odd economic theory, but it has a basis in the economics
of property law." 95 He restated Nelson and Fischel's basic
proposition:

86. Id. at 15. Coase was building an economic model, and realized that a world of
zero transactions costs was fanciful. Indeed, in such a world reallocations of resources
would take place instantaneously. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE
LAW 14-15 (1988).
87. Coase, supra note 84, at 2.
88. David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351,
413 n.187 (2014).
89. See supra note 47-48 and accompanying text.
90. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
91. See Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace

Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 827, 834 (1999).
92. ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 39-511 (1977).
93. See e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 72-149 (1985).
94. David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013).
95. Id. at 1681.
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If landowners have an absolute right to build, and a
landowner wants to build something that has a negative
effect on her neighbors, the transaction costs and
collective action problems of getting all the neighbors
together to pay the property holder not to build (or to
build less) would be prohibitive. If, on the other hand,
local governments, representing the interests of
property holders in a city, have the ability to deny a
landowner the right to build for any reason, the
potential developer can simply pay the city for the right
to build. The assignment of the right should not matter
if transaction costs are low, as Coasean bargaining
between the developer and the city should ensure that
we get to the optimal amount of development. 96
As Schleicher noted, some problems with this approach are
that local officials represent what Fischel calls their
"homevoter" constituents, who are concerned with the value of
their homes. 97 Thus, these constituents try to raise property
values through restricting the supply of homes, 98 and also try
to avoid responsibility for paying taxes for the poor. 99
From the perspective of private property rights, Schleicher's
summary elides over two fundamental problems. First,
transactional purchasers of rights pertaining to land are
unwilling to pay for the subjective value placed on those rights
by previous owners. In consensual transactions, those losses of
idiosyncratic value are inframarginal, since the prior holders
nevertheless are willing to sell. 100 However, that is not the case
when government appropriates property through eminent
domain, since the measure of compensation is only the
objective "fair market" value. 101 That led Judge Richard Posner

96. Id.at 1682 (internal citation omitted).
97. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LoCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLITICS
(2001).
98. Schleicher, supra note 94, at 1684 (2013) (citing inter alia, Robert C.
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J.
385, 400 (1977)).
99. Id.
100. See James M. Buchanan and Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29
ECONOMICA 371 (1962) (describing as irrelevant, changes that do not actually affect
decision making).
101. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25--26 (1984) ("The Fifth
Amendment requires that the United States pay 'just compensation'-normally
measured by fair market value-whenever it takes private property for public use.")
(citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374, (1943) ("what a willing buyer would
pay in cash to a willing seller")).
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to observe that "[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense
is ... not full compensation." 10 2
Second, if local government "represent[s] the interests of
property holders in a city," 103 the concept of representation
apparently is based on one of two meanings. In the parens
patriae sense, it refers to the police power of the state to protect
its citizens, which is quite distinct from the takings power.
From the other perspective, where the state is deemed to be the
transactional agent of its citizens, the implicit suggestion is
either that property owners in a city have identical interests
with respect to local land use actions that affect some much
more than others, which is at best an overstatement, or that
local government otherwise will ensure that things even out
through the concept of reciprocity of advantage. The phrase
"average reciprocity of advantage" was famously used by
Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 104 to refer to
the kind of implicit, in-kind compensation that might occur, for
instance, when the benefit derived from neighbors being
subject to a restriction at least offsets the loss that the
restriction inflicts on any given property owner. 105
Reciprocity of advantage is the basis for detailed private
restrictions issued by homeowners' associations, and some
commonplace public regulations, such as those requiring wide
setbacks from the street for all houses on a boulevard. 106 The
concept also is applicable within some well-defined districts,
such as preservation of building facades within the French
Quarter of New Orleans. 107 But the doctrine is inherently
problematic where the unusual and valuable assets possessed
by a few are restricted for the benefit of the many. A classic
instance occurred in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York, 108 which upheld the landmarking of some 400
buildings in New York City, including Grand Central Terminal,

102. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
103. Schleicher, supra note 94, at 1682.
104. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
105. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 195-215 (1985).
106. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, State of Nature Theory, and
Environmental Protection, 4 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 30-31 (2009) (noting that height
and setback restrictions can secure average reciprocity of advantage, thereby leaving
"[a]ll group members ... better off," with the regulation "overcom[ing] transactional
obstacles that prevent cooperation").
107. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
108. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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to benefit the City's millions of residents. Then-Justice William
Rehnquist filed a vehement dissent invoking that tremendous
disparity . 109
Agglomeration was suggested by Professor Schleicher as
the deus ex machina to deal with the problem of non-reciprocal
reciprocity.no Through agglomeration, as Alfred Marshall
observed nearly a century ago, workers skilled in a specialized
trade gather where there are many potential employers, firms
specialized in that industry gather where there are many
suitable employees, and the "mysteries of the trade" are
explicated and advanced through informal conversation
everywhere.ll 1 As economist Robert Lucas memorably
explained: "What can people be paying Manhattan or
downtown Chicago rents for, if not for being near other
people?" 112
But if agglomeration increases the size of the pie of urban
prosperity, it does not give the local government ownership of
its slices. While Schleicher states that cities do redistribute
income, "largely because of the existence of agglomeration
economics,"ll 3 that does not confront the reciprocity problem.
Perhaps, as the Armstrong principle sought to invoke, "public
burdens" should not be disproportionately concentrated on the
few.n 4 As Dr. Samuel Johnson observed three centuries ago
"[r]eciprocity long has been recognized as a necessity ingredient
in human relations."ll5

109. Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Where a relatively few individual
buildings, all separated from one another, are singled out and treated differently from
surrounding buildings, no such reciprocity exists. The cost to the property owner which
results from the imposition of restrictions applicable only to his property and not that
of his neighbors may be substantial-in this case-several million dollars-with no
comparable reciprocal benefits.").
110. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economics Subject, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1507, 1515-29 (2010) (providing an overview of agglomeration economics).
111. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 156 (8th Ed. 1890). Other
leading works on agglomeration include: EDWARD GLAESER, TRlUMPH OF THE CITY:
How OUR GREATEST INVENTION MAKES Us RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER,
AND HAPPIER 186 (2011); EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING
FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: How TO MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 58
(2008).
112. Schleicher, supra note 94, at 1687 (quoting Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the
Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3, 39 (1988)).
113. Id. at 1684 n.37 (citing CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LoCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND
LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURTS 72-105 (2011)).
114. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (quoted in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 125, 133-34 (1978)).
115. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 245 (London: 1830)
(letter to James Boswell, ca. March 15, 1774) ("Life cannot subsist in society but by
reciprocal concessions.").
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If common-law ownership includes rights to reasonable
development, then agglomeration does not make the takings
issue superfluous. If agglomeration has the effect of making a
community more prosperous, it could increase taxes, but the
imposition of taxes must not be conflated with the arrogation of
property rights. The Supreme Court recently observed that "[i]t
is beyond dispute that '[t]axes and user fees ... are not
"takings.""' 116
Without formal theorizing, Chief Judge Breitel of the New
York Court of Appeals built upon the premise that property
rights are more valuable if the property is located within a
thriving community. In that court's opinion in Penn Central, 117
he stated:
[T]he extent to which government, when regulating
private property, must assure what is described as a
reasonable return on that ingredient of property value
created not so much by the efforts of the property owner,
but instead by the accumulated indirect social and
direct governmental investment in the physical property,
its functions, and its surroundings. us
Under Chief Judge Breitel's reasoning, as Professor Fischel
noted, government is "entitled to appropriate to itself all of the
advantages of civilization." 11 9

C. Zoning for Dollars
The movement away from long-term comprehensive
planning and Euclidean zoning, where designated uses are
permissible "as of right," 120 has given rise to a number of
schemes to facilitate land use planning and bargaining. 121

116. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600-01 (2013)
(quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, at 243, n. 2 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
117. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977),
atf'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
118. Id. at 1272-73 (emphasis added).
119. WILLIAM A. FlSCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
50 (1995). For additional discussion of this point, see Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the
Dirigiste Tradition, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1071 (2011).
120. See Lee Anne Fennell, Eduardo M. Penalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 S. CT.
REV. 287, 342 (2013) (noting that "[i]n the usual Euclidean zoning law," within
individual land use zones, "certain uses are permitted as of right, certain uses are
prohibited, and others are permitted with special approval, provided certain conditions
are met").
121. See infra Part V.B.
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To a large extent local governments have asserted the right
to control development on individual parcels. They might do so
through comprehensive zoning but, as previously noted, many
cities have concluded instead that a parcel-by-parcel
bargaining process would be superior. 122 The result is that
contemporary land use planning typically proceeds in
"piecemeal fashion ... [whereby] regulators have discretion to
block a project or permit it to go forward, and they bargain
with the landowner over the terms on which they will approve
the project." 123
In his classic article Zoning for Dollars, 124 Jerold Kayden
described "incentive zoning" as the process by which "cities
grant private real estate developers the legal right to disregard
zoning restrictions in return for their voluntary agreement to
provide urban design features." 125 While developer-funded
amenities are beguiling, the concept has two obvious problems.
One is that the invitation to "disregard" existing zoning calls
the planning enterprise into question. As Kayden put it, it
"intrinsically delegitimizes the entire regulatory system." 126
The other problem is that the lack of a stable and objective
baseline for as-of-right development invites the sale and
purchase of the police power and also corruption. 127
Kayden tried to avoid those problems by asserting that
developers are entitled to "first tier" zonmg "without
obligation" and that "[g]overnment invents ex nihilo
development rights above the first tier and offers them strictly
in its discretion . . . . 128 However, government does not invent
development rights ex nihilo-out of nothing. Those rights
generally do not spring full-blown from the imagination of
planners after the basic zoning is codified. Rather, they present
a perhaps irresistible invitation to zoning authorities to

122. See supra notes 84-96, and accompanying text.
123. Fennell & Penalver, supra note 120, at 300.
124. Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments
on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3
(1991) (describing the growing use by municipalities of incentive zoning to fund various
local needs and amenities).
125. Id. at 3 (including as examples affordable housing and parks).
126. Id. at 7.
127. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Values and Value Creation in Public-Private
Transactions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 937, 985 n.56 (2009).
128. Kayden, supra note 124, at 38.
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downsize the first tier bundle with the expectation of selling
the withheld rights to developers later. 129
Local officials greatly influence the scope of development in
many ways other than through zoning and permitting. For
instance, they facilitate tax increment financing (TIF), which is
the most widely used development tool in the country. 130 TIF
projects are financed using bond financing subsidized by the
federal government, and real estate taxes on the "incremental"
value of the improved land is diverted from general local
government to servicing the bond. 131 "Scant public reporting of
TIF expenditures and revenues, 'guided by the invisible hand
of lobbyists, political action committees and campaign
contributions,' does nothing to allay suspicions of favoritism
and corruption." 132
As I have discussed elsewhere, "the execution of good public
policy inherently is improvisational and opportunistic." 13 3
Unfortunately, this flexibility leaves officials with ample
latitude to make off-the-record demands, benefitting the
municipality, that are blunt and overbearing, 13 4 and perhaps
inuring to their own benefit, as well. One example of the latter
is the acquisition by a political leader of land adjacent to that
upon which there soon would be built a desirable municipal
improvement, a process that a Tammany chieftain referred to
as "honest graft." 135 There are many alternatives to corrupt
politicians accepting cash payments. 136

129. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 927 (noting that "[this] argument is undoubtedly correct" with regard to
transferable development rights (TDRs)).
130. See generally Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Financing and
the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 65 (2010).
131. See George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That's Right for California
Redevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 998-99 (2001) (illustrating how TIF diverts
substantial funds from schools and county services).
132. George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: The Uses
and Abuses of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAW. 427, 473 (2011) (quoting Ike
Wilson, Study: Young Businesses Grow Faster, FREDERICK NEWS-POST, Apr. 30, 2009,
http://www.fredericknewspost.com/sections/archives/display_detail.htm ?Story ID
=96285).
133. Steven J. Eagle, The Perils of Regulatory Property in Land Use Regulation, 54
WASHBURNL.J. 1, 2 (2014).
134. See infra Part IV.
135. Eagle, supra note 133, at 6 (describing the activities of New York City's
legendary leader of Tammany Hall, George Washington Plunkitt).
136. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of
Takings Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1694 (2010) ("[I]n most contexts, even
thoroughly corrupt politicians will be unable to or unwilling to take undisguised cash
payments. Rather, corrupt politicians will seek to get paid indirectly. The payments
may take a variety of forms, such as campaign contributions, business contracts with
associates of the politician, and so forth."). This example was quoted in Gregory M.
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Local officials do not want to harm their communities or
their personal standing as a result of failed development
projects, and it is difficult for them to acquire the foundational
knowledgeable for astute bargaining without the expert
assistance of experienced developers, who are apt to want a
piece of the action as a quid pro quo. 137 As Professor George
Lefcoe observed: "Politically connected developers confer
informally with public officials about the possibility of striking
a redevelopment deal long before the formal redevelopment
process begins." 138
Well-connected local developers who have done successful
projects in the past have a large advantage because they are
known to be reliable and discreet. This opens the possibility of
"crony capitalism," which has been defined in this context as
the "tendency of ostensible public-sector regulatory authorities
reaching out to help their 'friends' in the private sector." 139
While it might be viewed from an economics perspective simply
as a type of special interest regulation "by forcing us to see the
particular cronies involved in shady deals, an emphasis on
crony capitalism may be politically more useful than the more
standard analysis."140
Finally, the "zoning for dollars" problem works two ways.
State and local business development agencies might have to
incentivize businesses to locate or remain in the area. This
might involve provision of infrastructure or job training, but
also could involve government condemnation of numerous
small parcels, with the resulting "superparcel" made available
for new commercial development. 141 I have argued that, if such

Stein, Reverse Exactions, 26 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. *l, *8 (forthcoming 2017)
(https://ssrn.com/abstract=2933013 )(making counterpoint to assertion that dangers of
corruption are low in the exactions context).
137. See Eagle, supra note 119, at 1079.
138. George Lefcoe, After Keio, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic

Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and
School Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 80 (2008).
139. Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the
Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1571, 1583 (1999) (reporting on
American crony capitalism, conflicts of interest, and lack of transparency).
See also Shawn Boburg, How Kushner Funded a Luxury Tower, WASH.
POST, June 1, 2017, http://wapo.st/2qGLDSz?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.66c57f8af25a
(describing how Kushner consultants worked with New Jersey state officials to devise a
map that connected the project location to an area including "some of the city's poorest
and most crime-ridden neighborhoods" four miles away, while at the same time they
excluded some wealthy neighborhoods only blocks away).
140. Paul H. Rubin, Crony Capitalism, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 105, 106-07 (2015).
141. Classic cases include Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765
(Mich. 2004) (upholding condemnation of entire ethnic neighborhood for construction of
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practices are to occur, the former owners should have a
realistic opportunity to acquire an equity stake in the resulting
redevelopment. 142
Notably, while government actions that discriminate
against out-of-state firms run afoul of the "dormant Commerce
Clause," the Supreme Court has not considered whether state
incentives that operate in favor of out-of-state firms to relocate
should be included.143

D. Exactions and Regulatory Property
1. The Pervasiveness of Exactions in Planning

How might we best view the demand of a municipality that
a landowner provide a quid pro quo as a condition for obtaining
a development permit? Exactions might range from dedicating
land within a large subdivision for a new elementary school or
a turn lane at the entrance, through providing funds to expand
off-site infrastructure serving the project, to contributing for
uses such as distant job retraining centers with only the most
attenuated connection to the proposed development. 144 As
Professors Lee Anne Fennell and Eduardo Penalver have
described, American land use planning has been replete with
"exactions creep." 145
The Supreme Court's analysis of exactions began with
Nollan u. California Coastal Commission,1 46 where it required
that an "essential nexus" exist between a legitimate state

Cadillac assembly plant); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding
condemnation for regional economic revitalization to constitute valid "public use").
142. See Steven J. Eagle, Assembling Land for Urban Redevelopment: The Case for
Owner Participation, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: EMINENT DOMAIN AND REGULATORY
TAKINGS RE-EXAMINED 7 (Bruce L. Benson ed., 2010).
143. See generally Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998) (analyzing issues); Richard C. Schragger, Cities,
Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1096
(2008) (noting that "cities are apt to engage in behavior that might be too solicitous of
mobile capital, by forcing current residents to subsidize the entry of new or preferred
arrivals").
144. See Kayden, supra note 124, at 3 ("[C]ities grant private real estate
developers the legal right to disregard zoning restrictions in return for their voluntary
agreement to provide urban design features such as plazas, atriums, and parks, and
social facilities and services such as affordable housing, day care centers, and job
training.").
145. See Fennell & Penalver, supra note 120, at 342.
146. 483 U.S. 835 (1987).
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interest and the "permit condition." 147 Next, where such a
nexus did exist in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 148 the Court held
that requirement to be a predicate to more penetrating inquiry,
in which the municipality would have to demonstrate that
there was a "rough proportionality" between the required
exaction and the impact of the proposed development, and that
this be supported by an "individualized determination" as
opposed to a more general study of the area. 149
Most recently, in Koontz u. St. Johns River Water
Management District, 150 the Court applied the Nollan-Dolan
principle to cases where the landowner was given the
alternative of providing cash instead of an interest in real
property, and also where the landowner refused to submit to
the permit conditions. Writing for the Court, Justice Samuel
Alita stated that the Court had "little trouble" distinguishing
between the alternative of paying money in lieu of submitting
to an exaction of real property and, as the respondents had
suggested the case involved, exerc1smg the "power of
taxation." 15 1 In response to the contention that there was no
taking where the permit conditioned upon an exaction was
declined by the landowner, the Court responded:
Extortionate demands for property in the land-use
permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not
because they take property but because they
impermissibly burden the right not to have property
taken without just compensation. As in other
unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone
refuses to cede a constitutional right in the face of
coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a
governmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable
injury. 152
Justice Alita further stated that government may not
"engageO in 'out-and-out ... extortion"' by "... leverag[ing] its
legitimate interest in mitigation" of police power burdens

147. Id. at 837 (holding that the Commission's statutory powers to protect the
view of the ocean from the public highway in front of a home did not justify a demand
for an public easement of way behind the home, along the shore).
148. 512 U.S. 374, 376 (1994).
149. Id. at 391.
150. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
151. Id. at 2602.
152. Id. at 2596.
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caused by the proposed development." 153 Nollan, Dolan, and
Koontz all involved exaction demands "adjudicated" by agency
administrators, rather than legislated by a city council.
Notably, the Court has not yet extende·d Nollan-Dolan to
legislative exactions, and Justice Thomas recently reiterated
that he "continue[d] to doubt that 'the existence of a taking
should turn on the type of governmental entity responsible for
the taking."' 154 Scholarly reaction to Koontz has been mixed,
with some enthusiastically in favor, 155 some qualifying support
to adjudicative exactions, 156 and some dismissing the idea that
extortion plays a significant role in the exactions process. 157
Professor Timothy Mulvaney has warned that scholars
favoring a Progressive view of property should not be too quick
to defend the adjudicative-legislative distinction, since
conceding that legislative actions had greater legitimacy would
have untoward effects. 158 First, "the argument to immunize
legislative exactions from heightened scrutiny is necessarily
imbued with a tacit criticism of administrative exactions,"
which might produce "spillover effects on the many eminent
domain and regulatory takings situations that involve
administrative acts unrelated to exactions." 159 In addition, it
might result in "a pronounced shift in land use policy toward
broad, unbending legislative measures to avoid ... heightened
scrutiny," which would preclude finer-grained administrative
regulation would take into account "the personal, political, and
economic identities of those persons or groups" affected by land
use conflicts. 160

153. Id. at 2595.
154. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Parking Assn. of Ga., Inc. v.
Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
155. See, e.g., Christina M. Martin, Nollan and Dolan and Koontz-Oh My! The
Exactions Trilogy Requires Developers to Cover the Full Social Costs of Their Projects,
but No More, 51 WILLAME'ITE L. REV. 39, 41-42 (2014) ("Koontz will protect property
rights while also protecting the community by ensuring that developers bear the full
costs of their projects.").
156. See Shelley Ross Saxer, When Local Government Misbehaves, 2016 UTAH L.
REV. 105, 106 (2016) ("[L]egislative actions are subject to public hearings and are
generally directed to resolving issues affecting the community as a whole. But when
individual decision making is involved, there is considerable concern about self-dealing,
special interests, and the potential for abuse of power.").
157. See Daniel P. Selmi, Takings and Extortion, 68 FLA. L. REV. 323 (2016)
(rejecting the extortion narrative underlying the Koontz holding).
158. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 137 (2016).
159. Id. at 141.
160. Id. at 142.
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Also lending support to a broad view of exactions, but from
more of an economic perspective, Professor Gregory Stein
suggests that permitting exactions do not result from attempts
to enhance the public fisc at the expense of developers and
their buyers, but rather to offset the negative externalities
that the proposed development would impose on other
landowners. 161 In some cases, however, restrictions are imposed
not to eliminate ostensible negative externalities imposed by
the landowner, but rather to create positive externalities when
bestowed on recipients favored by local officials.1 62
Undoubtedly,
exactions
do
often
offset
negative
externalities, a point readily acknowledged in Koontz by
Justice Alito. 163 However, he also noted that "[s]o long as the
building permit is more valuable than any just compensation
the owner could hope to receive for the [property right taken],
the owner is likely to accede to the government's demand, no
matter how unreasonable." 164
As I have elaborated upon elsewhere, 165 municipalities have
informal mechanisms for demanding "volunteered" exactions
from one-time applicants that elude the formal record, and
many more ways of ensuring compliance from local developers
who are repeat players. "Zoning for dollars" is not an academic
exercise. Unless closely offsetting negative externalities that in
fact are generated by the project, in a residential context it
operates as a tax on homebuilders, the incidence of which

161. Stein, supra note 136, at *3 ("[T]he objective of an exaction is not for the
government to acquire a property right for its own use or to enrich itself in some other
way. Rather, the government seeks to ensure that other stakeholders that will suffer as
a result of the applicant's more intensive use do not bear an unfair portion of the cost of
that new development.").
162. See, e.g., George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kela: What's Blight Got
to Do with It?, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 803, 841 (2008) (noting that in many
subsidized redevelopment projects, "the local agency typically consults informally with
private developers before going forward," and that "blatant cronyism or corruption
might elude easy detection").
163. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013)
("A . . . reality of the permitting process is that many proposed land uses threaten to
impose costs on the public that dedications of property can offset.").
164. Id.
165. Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. L.J. 1,
28-29 (2014) (noting how developers or their attorneys may be engaged in
undocumented informal bargaining or subject to blunt demands outside of the formal
development application process). The title analogizes Yale Kamisar's Equal Justice in
the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN OUR TIME 1 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965) (comparing respect for defendants' rights
in the "mansion" of the courtroom with abusive preliminary conduct in the "gatehouse"
of the police station).
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largely is passed on to homebuyers, thus ironically making
housing less affordable. 166 That result would truly be a mark of
good intentions gone astray.
2. Regulatory Property

If small-scale urban land use regulation often is marked by
exactions from developers, important incentives for their
cooperation are the awarding of "regulatory property" and
entrenched rights Property rights are based on sources such as
state law. 167 One type of asserted right that is particularly
dubious is "regulatory property," which comprises grants of
government authority to engage in conduct that is unlawful for
others. 168 The monopoly on accepting street hails from
passengers by New York City taxicabs that possess City-issued
medallions is a classic example. 169
An increasingly general and pervasive form of regulatory
property is occupational licensure. While only some five percent
of workers required licenses to pursue their occupations in the
1950s, nearly a third do today. 170 While ostensibly promulgated
to improve product safety and quality, they do so only
marginally, while increasing prices and reducing availability. 171
"[T]hanks to the doctrine of Parker antitrust immunity, the one
entity that can most effectively engage in anti-competitive
conduct-the government-may do so with impunity, and
states may effectively nullify federal antitrust laws on behalf of
private monopolists." 17 2

166. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, 54 So. CAL. L. REV.
1167, 1170 (1981) (asserting that "most 'inclusionary' programs are ironically titled,"
since they "are essentially taxes on the production of new housing").
167. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests, of
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.").
168. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P, Morriss, The Techrwlogies of Property Rights:
Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q.
123 (2001) (coining term). See also Carol M. Rose. The Several Futures of Property: Of
Cyberspace and Folk Tales. Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129,
164-65 (1998).
169. See generally Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The
Case of New York Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 168 (2013) (supplying
details).
170. Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Arwther Name: Should Licensed
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2014).
171. Id. at 1096-98.
172. Timothy Sandefur, Freedom of Competition and the Rhetoric of Federalism:
North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 195, 196 (2015)
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Companies that have expended considerable sums in
reliance upon governmental restrictions that subsequently are
relaxed or eliminated may claim that, as a result, those costs
are "stranded" (i.e., non-recoverable) and they have suffered
"deregulatory takings." 173 Those arguments have not fared well
in the courts. 174
An assertion of regulatory property particularly germane to
land use was a claim that the loss in value of the transferable
development rights (TDRs) featured in the Penn Central casel75
constituted a taking. The TDRs were given to the railroad to
"mitigate" what otherwise might have been a regulatory taking
of its air rights above Grand Central Terminal. 176 Owners of
the TDRs would be permitted instead to develop some 1.2
million square feet of air rights in the vicinity of Grand Central
in excess of that permitted owners of those parcels under
generally applicable zoning. 177
As recounted by Professor Christopher Serkin, 40 years
later the air rights were still unused, and had been purchased
by Midtown TDR Ventures, which planned to sell them for a
substantial sum in booming Midtown Manhattan real estate
market. 178 However, a change in city zoning restrictions on
nearby parcels, allegedly at the behest of a neighboring owner,
deprived the TDRs of value, and Midtown TDR sued. 179 The
action was dismissed after the neighboring owner paid what
were described as nominal damages. 1so

(discussing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943) (upholding anti-competitive
compacts where they "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative
command of the state").
173. See J. Gregory Sidak &Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach
of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851 (1996) (coining term).
174. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d
934, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (explaining that businesses affected by regulation likely will
know the law and seek clarification if necessary) (citing Cruz v. Town of Cicero, No. 99
C 3286, 2000 WL 369666, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2000).
175. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For a
discussion of TDRs, see infra Part III.E.3.
176. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S at 137.
177. Serkin, supra note 129, at 914.
178. Id.
179. Complaint ii 5, Midtown TDR Ventures LLC v. City of New York, No. l:15-cv07647 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015); see also Charles V. Bagli, Owner of Grand Central
Sues Developer and City for $1.1 Billion Over Air Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/nyregion/owner-of-grand-central-sues-developerand-city-for-l-l-billion-over-air-rights.html (describing litigation).
180. Complaint for Notice of Dismissal, No. l:15-cv-07647 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2016); Charles V. Bagli, Owners of Grand Central Drop Lawsuit, Clearing Way
for a 1,401-Foot-Tall Skyscraper, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2016.
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A somewhat similar attempt to assert that government
benefits were entrenched as const~tutional property occurred in
Kaufmann's Carousel, Inc. v. (]ity of Syracuse Industrial
Development Agency. 181 There, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully
resisted the condemnation of easements on grounds including
that they had acquired their lease as the result of a previous
condemnation, which they asserted was a determination of
"public use," so that the subsequent condemnation could not be
for a public use. 18 2
While these cases might be deemed of passing interest, they
point to a much more profound problem-that of recipients of
government largesse attempting to entrench those benefits in
the form of constitutionally protected property. 183 We are likely
to see more attempts to treat stranded costs as "property,"
given the disruptions that new internet-based platform
companies are having on established, regulated industries. 18 4
Thus, there is a danger that what seem to be "mitigations"
based on fairness, such as the award of TD Rs, might be ossified
as entrenched property with a harmful result.

E. Other New Land Use Regulatory Techniques
While development exactions as a condition for project
approvals are perhaps the most common technique for
localities seeking land use flexibility and revenue, others have
played a prominent role, as well.
1. Grand Bargains

One device, building upon traditional local politics, urges
the formation of transitory coalitions of disparate interest
groups, assembled ad hoc to seize the moment and enact and
entrench zoning grand bargains. 185 However, such a plan would
create vested property rights on a grand scale and, one again,
hinder future adaptation to change. 186 The argument for
entrenchment is undermined by the fact that "uncertainty

181. 750 N.Y.S.2d 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
182. Id. at 221.
183. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding
Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879 (2011).
184. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 112 (2016).
185. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City,
101 lOWAL. REV. 91 (2015).
186. See Steven J. Eagle, On Engineering Urban Densi{ication, 4 BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 73, 78-79 (2015).
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concerning government policy is analytically equivalent to
general market uncertainty. The prevailing assumption in our
society that market solutions for allocating risk are preferable
to government remedies is therefore equally applicable when
the risks to be allocated arise from legal transitions." 187
2. Public-Private Partnerships

Public Private Partnerships for real estate development
project are long-term contractual agreements between
government agencies and private developers, whereby "the
skills and assets of each sector are shared in delivering a
development project." 188 The private entity might own a ground
lease and manage the project, with the agency maintaining
control through ownership of the fee simple and, perhaps, an
equity interest. 189 One form of public-private partnership is a
"business improvement district" (BID), in which businesses
located in specified geographical areas consent to the
assessment of taxes to pay for enhanced amenities such as
security and sanitation.190
Public Private Partnerships have been attacked for alleged
failures to provide adequate protection for individual rights
and democratic values. 191 "The eclipse of traditional land use
planning procedures by cities' wholehearted embrace of
development agreements and similar bilateral negotiated
approaches leaves next to no room for the public." 192 More
specifically, BIDs have been criticized as resulting from "a

187. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 520 (1986).
188. Thomas M. Gallas & Cheryl A. O'Neill, Public Private Partnerships: Design
and Finance Transforming Urban Neighbor/wads, 42 REAL ESTATE REV. J., Art. 2
(2013).
189. Id.
190. See Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement
Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366 (1999) (describing BIDs
as "one of the most intriguing and controversial recent developments in urban
governance" and "[c]ombining public and private, as well as city government and
neighborhood elements").
191. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Joseph C. Dugan, The Human Side of Public-

Private Partnerships: From New Deal Regulation to Administrative Law Management,
102 IOWA L. REV. 883 (2017).
192. David A. Marcello,

Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle for
Investment in America's Neighborhoods, 39 URB. LAW. 657, 661 (2007) (quoting
Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for
Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use
Decisions, Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 36--37 (2005)).

Fall 2017]

LAND USE REGULATION

117

series of flawed and contentious Supreme Court decisions
preferring localism over equality and privatization over free
speech." 193
Furthermore, sales and long-term leases of municipal
infrastructure to private entities that will run them often have
proved ill-advised and used to temporarily buttress the
finances of distressed cities. 194 "Unfortunately, all of these
stabilization methods are characterized by short-term cash
infusions that produce disproportionate future expenses or lost
future revenue." 195
3. Transferable Development Rights
TDRs are issued by government and permit the recipients
to transfer development precluded by regulation of their
existing parcels to other parcels they own or acquire. "Simply
put, TDR programs separate the development potential of a
parcel from the land itself and create a market where that
development potential can be sold." 196 Thus, an owner in a
"sending" zone receives TDRs in lieu of development in that
area that government wishes to protect, and can utilize the
TDRs to develop acquired property in a designated "receiving"
zone more intensively than its former owner was permitted. 197
The classic example of the use of TDRs was to "mitigate"
what otherwise might have been a taking in Penn Central. 198
As the Court explained: "While these rights may well not have
constituted 'just compensation' if a 'taking' had occurred, the
rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial
burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that
reason, are to be taken into account in considering the impact

193. Wayne Batchis, Business Improvement Districts and the Constitution: The
Troubling Necessity of Privatized Government for Urban Revitalization, 38 HAsTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 91, 92 (2010).
194. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J.
1118, 1168--69 (2014) (describing a problematic long-term lease of parking meters by a
"desperate" city of Chicago, whereby an investment group would receive $11.6 billion
from "a deal that paid the city $1.15 billion for a one-time budget fix").
195. Samir D. Parikh & Zhaochen He, Failing Cities and the Red Queen
Phenomenon, 58 B.C. L. REV. 599, 610 (2017).
196. Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et. al., Transferable Development Rights and
Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB. LAW. 441, 446 (1998).
197. Id. at 446--48.
198. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978). For
discussion, see supra notes 175--177 and accompanying text.
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of regulation." 199 Notably, the shifting of development rights
considered in Penn Central were from one part of the same
tract of land to another. 200
I have elsewhere criticized TDRs as wrongfully depriving
owners in the receiving zones of property without just
compensation. 201 First, as in exactions schemes generally, the
ability of localities to benefit from the sale of development
approvals for what Jerold Kayden in Zoning for Dollars
described as in excess of "first tier" rights encourages overregulation and corruption. 202 In addition, if dense development
is permissible on a certain parcel when the applicant owns
TDRs, that development should have been permissible had the
applicant for the same exact project been the original
landowner. 203
Professor Serkin has argued that, while my argument about
over-regulation was "undoubtedly correct," the "strong form" of
my argument "misconstrues the kinds of tradeoffs that are
ubiquitous in land use controls." 204 He added that "zoning is
much more fluid than this and frequently represents dynamic
tradeoffs," so that a city may desire density limitations in the
receiving area, but "may have an even greater interest in
protecting a historic building." 205 Awarding TDRs in this
situation "represents nothing more than a straightforward
cost-benefit analysis ."206
The division of a municipality into zoning districts does
represent a judgment regarding relative value among
permissible uses being situated in one area as opposed to
another. Also, the establishment of new uses in one part of
town might legitimately occasion rebalancing of other uses in a
different part of town.
However, ad hoc decisions awarding TDRs also constitute
ad hoc decisions reducing ownership rights. The point is that
local officials are not making abstract decisions that historic
features should be preserved and other abstract decision that

199. Id.
200. Id. at 130-31 ("In deciding whether a particular governmental action has
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole-here,
the city tax block designated as the 'landmark site."')
201. Eagle, supra note 133, at 34-36.
202. See Kayden, supra note 124. For discussion, see supra notes 123-128, and
accompanying text.
203. Eagle, supra note 133, at 34~36.
204. Serkin, supra note 129, at 926-27.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 927.
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more development might be permissible in another area.
Rather, as Professor Juergensmeyer and his colleagues more
aptly put it, the idea is to "separate the development potential
of a parcel from the land itself and create a market where that
development potential can be sold."207 The potential of "a
parcel" is "sold" in essentially a barter transaction to the
aggrieved owner of the historic site.
Concerns about TDRs mostly have involved the extent to
which they were adequate substitutes for reductions in the
rights of property owners. 208 However, I distinguish TDR
schemes in which owners of land in the sending areas are
compensated through reciprocity of advantage from those
schemes in which the municipality arrogates to itself the
benefits of restrictions giving value to the TD Rs.
In Barancik v. County of Marin, 209 development in the
Nicasio Valley north of San Francisco was stringently limited
to preserve the "beautiful rural landscape" and agricultural
use. 210 The TDR scheme "permitted ranchers in the valley to
sell to other property owners in the valley the right to develop
within the regulations of the community. A purchaser could
accumulate more than one development right." 211 In response
to the rhetorical question as to how the TDR scheme differed
from the sale of the police power, the Ninth Circuit responded
that buyers "are not being given a dispensation from zoning by
payment of a fee to the state," but rather "are being permitted
to accumulate development rights in the same area by a price
paid to the owner of the rights." 212 The court added that the
county "is rightly indifferent" as to who does the limited
amount of development permitted, and "lets the market decide
the price." 213
In the prevalent Penn Central type of TDR scheme, the
government is not at all indifferent as to who does the
development, but rather insists that it be done by the entity to

207. Juergensmeyer, supra note 196, at 446.
208. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762
(1973); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also
Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been
Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW.
307, 356-57 (1998) (describing substantial practical problems faced by TDR recipients).
209. 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988).
210. Id. at 835.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 837 (emphasis added).
213. Id.

120

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 33.1

which it has awarded rights or its assignee, for the purpose of
staving off a possible need to pay just compensation for a
restriction it imposed.
Professor Serkin correctly asserts that the protection of a
"historic building" through use of TDRs might have greater
benefit to society than the burden placed on owners in the
receiving zone. 214 But conferring benefit on society is an
attribute associated with both the police power and the takings
power. 215 A feature implicit in Penn Central TDR schemes is
that recipients who are singled out for worthiness are accorded
special development rights in specified zones designed to be
attractive to them. This seems counter to principles of fairness
enunciated in Armstrong, 216 and the centuries-old observation
reiterated in Kelo v. City of New London, 217 that "a law that
takes property from A. and gives it to B . . . is against all
reason and justice." 21 8
Perhaps the best answer to preserving a "historic building"
was enunciated just as TDRs first were coming into vogue:
"Rather than utilizing unreliable methods of shifting
preservation costs onto a select group (whether developers or
ardent supporters of landmark preservation), as is done
by TDR systems, the municipality itself should assume
responsibility for saving landmarks."219
4. Land Use Regulation as Neighborhood Property

In Fee Simple Obsolete, 220 Professor Lee Anne Fennell
suggested that government or another entity might be able to
acquire a "callable fee," whereby property within a "callblock"
would be available for subsequent repurposing. 221 While she
would capture the value of large-scale redevelopment for the

214. Serkin, supra note 129, at 927.
215. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987) (noting
that a government action that is a "legitimate exercise of the police power does not, of
course, insulate it from a takings challenge").
216. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (quoted in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123--24 (1978) (asserting that public
burdens" should not be "disproportionately concentrated" on the few.")).
217. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
218. Id. at 477 n.3 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798)).
219. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE
L.J. 1101, 1122 n.14 (1975)
220. Fennell, supra note 19.
221. Id. at 1482-85. "Properties within these 'callblocks' would be sold subject to a
call option. These call options would make each new possessory owner subject to
having her property repurchased later, along with the other properties in the
callblock[.J" Id. at 1484.
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community, the economist Robert Nelson argued that zoning
instantiates collective neighborhood property rights belonging
to the individuals in the neighborhood. 222 He proposed that
supermajorities of owners in neighborhoods they define be able
to sell all parcels, thus reaping for existing owners the
monetary value of the one consolidated parcel in excess of the
aggregate value of the many parcels that comprised it. 22 3 A
similar proposal for "land assembly districts" was made by
Professors Michael Heller and Rick Hills. 224
However, these proposals permit a self-selected group of
owners to custom design an area in which a super-majority can
arrogate to itself property interests of the dissenters. That
might result in land having more pecuniary value, but it would
be at the cost of the autonomy of the unwilling participants. 22 5
V. GOOD INTENTIONS AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING

One area where good intentions have been notably
ineffective has been the provision of affordable housing. As I
have discussed elsewhere, the popularity of affordable housing
results from its being a metaphor, not a policy or even a shared
specific goal for reducing housing prices in areas enjoying
economic prosperity and fine natural and cultural amenities. 226
Economic prosperity largely results from the presence of a
deep pool of talented workers and competing firms who can
utilize their specialized skills, together with those with the
wherewithal and tastes to add vibrancy. 227 The resulting
agglomeration makes for great cities. However, expanding

222. Robert H. Nelson, A Private Property Right Theory of Zoning, 11 URB. LAW.
713 (1979).
223. Nelson, supra note 91, at 834 (proposing that owners of land with
supermajorities by number of parcels or fair market value in neighborhoods they define
have powers to designate use or sale).
224. Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1465, 1468 (2008).
225. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Devolutionary Proposals and Contractarian
Principles, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 184-91 (F. H. Buckley, ed.
1999).
226. See Eagle, supra note 80.
227. See generally GLAESER supra note 111.
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cities tend to become congested, which offsets agglomerations
benefits. 228 Sometimes agglomeration enhances activities that
are undesirable, as well. 229
"Amenities" is an expansive term encompassing those
attributes that make residential living aesthetically pleasing
and vital. One way municipalities can jumpstart the process,
which is associated with Richard Florida, is by providing the
requisite amenities to lure the "creative class." 230 Some have
been skeptical of the concept, 231 and others thought that in
many cases causation worked in the other direction, with
prosperity leading to amenities. 232
In his 2017 book The New Urban Crisis, Florida
acknowledged that the high level of prosperity that the creative
class brought to a few cities that he celebrated 15 years earlier
was not an urban panacea. 233 While our urban crisis of the
1960s and 1970s, he asserted, was marked by "economic
abandonment of cities" and "white flight," "persistent poverty,"
and crime, 234 one element of our "new urban crisis" involves the
"deep and growing economic gap" between a handful of
"superstar" cities and technology hubs and other areas, which
Florida calls "winner-take-all urbanism." 235 Closely associated
are the "extraordinary high and increasingly unaffordable
housing prices and staggering levels of inequality" in superstar
cities. 236 But broader dimensions include the "growing
inequality, segregation, and sorting" within all cities, the
movement of "poverty, insecurity, and crime" into the suburbs,
and the "crisis of urbanization in the developing world." 237

228. See Nestor M. Davidson & John J. lnfranca, The Sharing Economy As an
Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 215, 225 (2016) (noting that congestion is
the "inverse" of the "many benefits that accrue from the proximity and density").
229. See Schleicher, supra note 110, at 1529 (referring to "factors that have
increasing returns to scale but a negative effect'' as "negative agglomeration").
230. See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND How IT'S
TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002).
231. See Steven J. Eagle, The Really New Property: A Skeptical Appraisal, 43 IND.
L. REV. 1229, 1262 (2010).
232. See Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local
Economic Development, 77 U. Cm. L. REV. 311, 328 (2010) (noting that in many
instances, such as Silicon Valley, it was economic prosperity that led to the creation of
amenities).
233. RICHARD FLoRIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS: How OUR CITIES ARE
INCREASING INEQUALITY, DEEPENING SEGREGATION, AND FAILING THE MIDDLE
CLASS-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2017).
234. Id. at 5.
235. Id. at 5--6.
236. Id. at 6.
237. Id. at 7-8.
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In outlying areas, the loss of manufacturing jobs has
contributed to rural America being the "new inner city." 238 The
plight of rural areas was highlighted by Anne Case and Angus
Deaton's path breaking work on the increase in "deaths of
despair"-death by drugs, alcohol and suicide. 239 "[F]or the first
time, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
now reports declines in life expectancy among less-educated
rural whites, especially in impoverished and remote counties of
Appalachia." 240
Recent evidence suggests that "[a]s young people and
builders have shifted their focus toward trendier urban
markets, overall housing construction has declined." 241 Recent
census data indicates, though, that suburban growth is
increasing again relative to growth in cities. 242 Some evidence
suggests a mixed pattern, with increased growth in the urban
core in some cities, and more sprawl in others, 243 with alreadydense metropolitan areas becoming denser, and sprawling
metro areas spreading out further. 244 "In some of the country's
largest and most prosperous markets, such as New York, San
Francisco, Boston and Los Angeles, housing construction has
been stronger than normal in the urban core but weaker in the
suburbs, where new housing can be built abundantly and more
cheaply ... "245

238. See Janet Adamy and Paul Overberg, Rural America is the New Inner City,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2017 at Al, https://www.wsj.com/articles/rural-america-is-thenew-inner-city-1495817008.
239. Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in
Midlife Among White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112
PROCEEDINGS NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
15078,
15078
(2015),
http://www.pnas.org/content/112/49/15078. "This increase for whites was largely
accounted for by increasing death rates from drug and alcohol poisonings, suicide, and
chronic liver diseases and cirrhosis. Although all education groups saw increases in
mortality from suicide and poisonings, and an overall increase in external cause
mortality, those with less education saw the most marked increases." Id.
240. Daniel T. Lichter & James P. Ziliak, The Rural-Urban Interface: New
Patterns of Spatial Interdependence and Inequality in America, 672 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 6, 20 (2017).
241. Laura Kusisto, Why Millennials Are (Partly) to Blame for the Housing
Shortage, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-millennialsare-partly-to-blame-for-the-housing-shortage-1495445403.
242. Thomas H, Frey, City Growth Dips Below Suburban Growth, Census Shows,
BROOKINGS, May 30, 2017).
243. Jed Kolko, Seattle Climbs but Austin Sprawls: The Myth of the Return to
Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2rKDQ70.
244. Id. (contrasting dense cities such as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco
with sprawling cities such as Austin and San Antonio).
245. Kusisto, supra note 241.
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This combination of faster population growth in
outlying areas and bigger price increases in cities points
to limited housing supply as a curb on urban growth,
pushing people out to the suburbs. It's a reminder that
where people live reflects not only what they
want - but also what's available and what it costs. 246

It is important to note that neither population growth nor
diversity necessarily contributes to prosperity since, as
Professor Lee Anne Fennell observed, prosperity has a function
of "agglomeration-friendly and congestion-mitigating traits,"
and "[t]he challenge is to assemble participants together whose
joint consumption and production activities will maximize
social value." 247 Furthermore, even beyond the incompatibility
of productive uses, a lack of proper controls of open city spaces
can result in a "tragedy of the urban commons" 248 in which
"chronic street nuisances" drive out other users. 249
A. Preservation of Community

Political entitles have their own character, which is another
way of saying that they favor the particular values and desires
of existing residents over those of putative possible residents,
or over what some might fancy to be the universal values of a
better world. The perceptive land use practitioner and scholar
Richard Babcock referred to this tendency as "municipal
primogeniture."2 50 Since Euclid, we have recognized that
parochial interests sometimes must yield to the common
good. 251 One basic problem, however, is discerning what the
common good is.
While the term "intersectionality" generally is associated
with problems pertaining to race that are complex, intertwined,

246. Kolko, supra note 243.
247. Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2014)
(internal citations omitted).
248. Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. &
POL 'y REV. 281, 298--99 (2016).
249. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169 (1996)
(defining "chronic street nuisances" as protracted annoying behavior in public spaces,
such as aggressive panhandling or graffiti, that drives out other users).
250. RICHARD BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 150 (1966).
251. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926) ("It is not
meant by this [upholding of local autonomy], however, to exclude the possibility of
cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the
municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way.").
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and thus particularly difficult to solve, 252 many other land
use problems have similar characteristics. The great
environmentalist John Muir made the point over a century ago
that "[w]hen we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it
hitched to everything else in the universe." 253
The ties that bind people within neighborhoods exemplify
interrelationships.
An
especially valued
amenity
is
preservation of neighborhood character. This term relates to
the deep satisfaction that many people enjoy in being deeply
rooted in a community. 254 Established communities are
important to the creation and maintenance of what we now
refer to as "social capital."25 5

In the affordable housing context, rootedness leads
to preferences that often conflict. Upper-middle class
neighborhoods cling tenaciously to preservation of their
character as stable, low-density areas of handsome singlefamily homes, sometimes adjoining quaint shopping areas or
scenic natural vistas. 256 Such residents, and the local officials
they elect, seek to protect their way of life from those who
would settle for housing that is less attractive, but more
affordable. 257 The large inequality between the growing uppermiddle class and the lower socioeconomic classes has a
"physical dimension in that most metropolitan areas differ
greatly by the size and price of the homes m their
neighborhoods and communities." 258 Recent data analysis
suggests that there is a growing disparity of incomes within

252. See Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989) (introducing term into the
legal literature).
253. JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 110 (Sierra Club Books 1988)
(1911).
254. See generally, JOHN BRINCKERHOFF JACKSON, A SENSE OF PLACE, A SENSE OF
TIME (1994).
255. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALoNE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000) ("Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects
and human capital refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to
connections among individuals-social networks and the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that arise from them.")
256. For a pertinent example, see DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS IN PARADISE: THE NEW
UPPER CLASS AND HOW THEY GOT THERE (2000) (describing the folkways of "hobos," the
contemporary meld of bourgeoisie and bohemians, who lead expansive upper-middle
class lifestyles while professing devotion to the verities of the simple life through
consumption of very expensive kitchen equipment, primitive art, and eco-tourism).
257. See FISCHEL, supra note 97, at 18 (describing how the "mercenary concern
with property values" of "'homevoters' and their elected representatives shape zoning
in homogeneous communities").
258. Stephen J. Rose, The Growing Size and Incomes of the Upper Middle Class 14
(Urban Institute Income and Benefits Policy Center, June 2016).
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neighborhoods of large American cities, and that this results in
lifelong effects on international mobility and opportunity for
children exposed to it.259
This proclivity of the upper-middle class to protect its
position and pass its status on to its children, which largely
takes the form of exclusionary zoning, with the ensuing
exclusive school districts, recently was criticized by Richard
Reeves in his book Dream Hoarders. 260 As Thomas Edsall
recently added, upper-middle class Democrats might support
redistributive taxation, but not affordable housing or having a
child lose a place at Princeton to a poorer worthy student. 261
In a
similar manner, traditional working class
neighborhoods, often built around shared ethnicity, faith, and
extended family, cling to their heritage. 262 In both cases,
neighborhood preservation has the effect of impinging upon fair
housing, which might be looked at as intentional, 263 or
alternatively resulting from the fact that "the very notion
of community, however broadly conceived, depends on
exclusion." 264
Similar impulses for neighborhood preservation have led
inner-city residents to protest "gentrification." Recent evidence
suggests that gentrification might result in substantial part
from an increase in the number of higher-income households
with a reduced tolerance for commuting, 265 with recent lower

259. Andreoli Francesco & Eugenio Peluso, So Close Yet so Unequal: Spatial
Inequality in American Cities, (Luxembourg Inst. of Socio-Econ. Research (LISER)
Working Paper Series 2017-11, July 13, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3003959
(using Geni-type indices investigate patterns and consequences of spatial inequality in
American cities over the last 35 years).
260. RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: How THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE
CLASS IS LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT (2017) (asserting that "opportunity hoarding" among the upper middle
class through devices such as zoning, occupational licensing, schooling and college
application procedures, reduces mobility and results in a less open society and less
competitive economy).
261. Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Has the Democratic Party Gotten Too Rich for Its
Own Good?, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2sqAqXI.
262. See generally, ALAN EHRENHALT, THE LOST CITY: THE FORGOTTEN VIRTUES
OF COMMUNITY IN AMERICA (1996).
263. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities,
92 VA. L. REV. 437, 437 (2006) ("Developers will select common amenities not only on
the basis of which amenities are inherently welfare-maximizing for the residents, but
also on the basis of which amenities most effectively deter undesired residents from
purchasing homes therein.").
264. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 487, 492
(2017).
265. See Lena Edlund, et al., Bright Minds, Big Rent: Gentrification and the
Rising Returns to Skill 2 (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper
No. CES-WP-16-36, 2016), https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2016/CES-WP-16-36.pdf.
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urban crime rates also playing a role. 266 Residents who are
homeowners may want to sell to upscale and often-young
buyers at what they consider inflated prices. But inner-city
tenants are squeezed out by dramatically higher rents, without
the consolation of a handsome return. 26 7
The interaction between urban displacement and
gentrification can be "sensitive to income inequality, density,
and varied preferences for different types of spatial
amenities." 268 On the other hand, sometimes decaying
neighborhoods are spruced up, and ensuing higher real estate
tax collections permit often-strapped municipalities to make
vitally-needed improvements to local schools, roads, and
hospitals. 269
In a more general sense, attempts at historic preservation
of existing structures and patterns of human association can be
at variance with urban culture itself, which might be "defined
by dynamism, vitality, and an ability to adapt to and
accommodate population and market shifts." 270 A recent study
by Ann Owens found that "the geographic deconcentration of
assisted housing, the result of several housing programs
initiated since the 1970s, only modestly reduced metropolitanarea poverty concentration from 1980 to 2009 .... Even though
a substantial policy shift occurred, its effectiveness in reducing
poverty concentration was tempered by the existing context of
durable urban inequality." 271 As one supporter of fair and
affordable housing concluded:
[T]he road to the current land use regulatory context in
the United States is a full century long. The first six
decades of that process took on the appearance of a

266. See Ingrid Gould Ellen, et al., Has Falling Crime Invited Gentrification?
(U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. for Econ.Studies Paper No. CES-WP-17-27, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2930242.
267. See generally, Miriam Zuk, et al., Gentrification, Displacement and the Role of
Public Investment: A Literature Review (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working
Paper 2015---05, 2015).
268. Geoff Boeing, The Effects of Inequality, Density, and Heterogeneous

Residential Preferences on Urban Displacement and Metropolitan Structure: An
Agent-Based Model 1, (Dec. 20, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id =2939933.
269. See J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 How. L.J. 405, 405---06
(2003).
270. Anika Sing Lemar, Zoning as Taxidermy: Neighborhood Conservation
Districts and the Regulation of Aesthetics, 90 IND. L.J. 1525, 1525 (2015).
271. Ann Owens, Housing Policy and Urban Inequality: Did the Transformation of
Assisted Housing Reduce Poverty Concentration?, 94 (1) Soc. FORCES 325, 326 (Sept.
2015).

128

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 33.1

headlong race toward exclusionary policies while the
last four decades have been marked by occasional but
ultimately not transformative attempts to press the
brakes and restore balance. None of those attempts
have fundamentally
reshaped
how
people
in
communities on the ground think about land use
regulation. 272

B. Assistance to the poor and inner cities
The clearest intentions regarding affordable housing relate
to the provision of homes for low- and moderate-income
families. Even here, however, a number of different goals work
at cross-purposes. Government subsidies for the construction of
low-income housing seems the most direct affordable housing
device, with the major exception of public housing projects,
which in many cases proved disastrous. 273
In his reflections on the first 25 years of the Journal of
Affordable Housing and Community Development, Professor
Tim Iglesias advocated that fair housing was "joined at the hip"
with the Journal's principal concerns, and that the Journal has
a "unique opportunity to provide a forum for integrating fair
housing issues" into its existing affordable housing and
community development focus. 274 Another need for a holistic
approach advanced by Professor Iglesias relates to whether
racial and socioeconomic residential segregation should be
dealt with the using "traditional integration model," which
focuses on the community as a geographical and social unit, or
using the "individual access to the opportunity structure
model," which focuses on the location of households vis-a-vis
good schools, workplaces, medical facilities, cultural amenities,
and the like. 275
One of the more successful affordable housing programs has
been the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which "is
one of the few government resources dedicated to helping low

272. Thomas Silverstein, State Land Use Regulation in the Era of Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing, 24 J. AFFORD. Rous. 305, 328 (2015).
273. See EUGENE J. MEEHAN, THE QUAIJTY OF FEDERAL POLICYMAKING:
PROGRAMMED FAILURE IN PuBLIC HOUSING 66-87 (1979) (discussing the demolition of
the infamous Pruitt-Igoe Housing Project and the St. Louis Housing Authority).
274. Tim Iglesias, Affordable Housing, Fair Housing and Community
Development: Joined at the Hip, We Need to Learn to Walk Together, 25 J. AFFORDABLE
Rous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 195, 198 (2017).
275. Tim Iglesias, Two Competing Concepts of Residential Integration 24, (Univ. of
S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2017-09, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2965214.
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income families find safe, decent and affordable housing." 276 "In
its simplest form, LIHTC 'subsidizes the acquisition,
construction, and/or rehabilitation of rental property by private
developers."' 277 However, after its recent review of federal
housing finance data, The New York Times, while noting that
LIHTC is the nation's "biggest source of funding for affordable
housing," concluded that in the largest metropolitan areas
housing utilizing LIHTC is "disproportionately built in
majority nonwhite communities." 278 Furthermore, the value
of the tax credits is highly dependent on the level of
corporate taxation, so that contemplated Trump administration
reductions in rates already suggests significant cutbacks in
their use. 279 Another popular program, which does not require
subsidies for capital investment, is Section 8 housing, 280 which
subsidizes rents in scattered private residential buildings.
However, as Section 8 contracts expire, the housing might
revert to market rate, and federal funding for the program
might be cut substantially.2s1
Another major issue, largely intersecting with questions of
race, is affordable housing in more affluent suburbs. In 1968,
the Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbade the denial of housing
opportunities on the basis of "race, color, religion, or national
origin." 282 Yet in 2015, writing for the majority in Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive

276. Lance Bocarsly & Rachel Rosner, The Low Income Housing Tax Credit: A
Valuable Tool for Financing the Development of Affordable Housing, 33 THE PRAC.
REAL EST. LAW. 29, 30 (2017).
277. Courtney Lauren Anderson, Affirmative Action for Affordable Housing, 60
How. L.J. 105, 140 (2016) (quoting Paul Duncan et al., Tax Incentives for Economic
Development: What is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit?, in TAX POLICY CTR, THE
TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK (2009)).
278. John Eligon, et al., Program to Spur Low-Income Housing is Keeping Cities
Segregated, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2tBQ06t (citing the claim of fairhousing advocates that "the government is essentially helping to maintain entrenched
racial divides, even though federal law requires government agencies to promote
integration.").
279. See Robert McCartney, Trump's Budget Plans Have Already Cut Financial
Support for Low-Cost Housing, WASH. POST, July 1, 2017, http://wapo.st/2szlcNj?tid=
ss_mail&utm_term=.dl046d506a85 (noting that "the loss of tax-credit financing has
had its most severe impact in rural areas, towns or small cities, where investors are
wary of financing affordable housing in the first place").
280. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 982 (2015) (the program is more formally known as
the Federal Housing Choice Voucher program).
281. See Jose A. DelReal, Trump Administration Considers $6 Billion Cut
to HUD Budget, WASH. POST, March 8, 2017, http://wapo.st/2mDrips?tid=
ss_mail&utm_term=.3a9a5ccc0c9c ("Budgets for public housing authorities---city and
state agencies that provide subsidized housing and vouchers to local residents - would
be among the hardest hit. Under the preliminary budget, those operational funds
would be reduced by $600 million, or 13 percent.").
282. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-06 (2012).
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Communities Project, 283 Justice Kennedy related that patterns
of racial segregation had continued. 284 The petitioners had
argued that Texas allocated tax credits intended to assist lowincome families obtain affordable housing disproportionately to
predominately black inner-city areas. 285 The 5-4 majority held
that petitioners could utilize evidence of disproportionate
impact on protected groups in establishing their case, and need
not show discriminatory intent. 286 Three weeks later, the HUD
issued rules on "Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing"
("AFFH") that required localities to collect detailed statistical
data as a prelude to stricter enforcement. 2s7
However, as noted by Professor Kenneth Stahl, "[e]fforts to
break down these zoning barriers have faced fierce political
resistance," 288 and "the issue of affordable housing threatens to
break up the democratic party coalition between affluent white
suburbanites and lower-income minorities." 289 Perhaps the
best-known litigation involving the duty of localities accepting
HUD funds to affirmatively further affordable housing involved
Westchester County, N.Y., an affluent area north of New York
City. 290 In July 2017, HUD reversed the long-asserted view it
held during the Obama administration and during the first few
months of the Trump administration that Westchester had not
complied with the affordable housing promises it made as a
condition of receiving HUD subsidies. 291

283. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
284. Id. at 2515-16.
285. Id. at 2514.
286. Id.
287. See generally "Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing," 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272
(July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al.).
288. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 487, 491
(2017).
289. Id. at 491 n.16 (citing Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Can Hillary Manage Her
Unruly Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/
opinion/campaign-stops/can-hillary-manage-her-unrulcoalition.html?smprod=nytcoreipad&smid =nytcore-ipad-share).
290. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v.
Westchester Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the county
made false certifications to HUD to obtain federal funding for housing and community
development, but that the fact issue of whether the falsity was intentional precluded
summary judgment).
291. Sarah Maslin Nir, For Westchester, 11th Time Is Charm In Fight
Over Fair Housing, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/
201 7/07 /21/nyregion/westchester-fair-housing-hud-trump.html. ("The agency's decision,
delivered to the county in a July 14 letter, was based on a review of a wning analysis,
versions of which had been rejected 10 times under the Obama administration as
insufficient proof that the problem had been fixed." A spokesman for County Executive
Rob Astorino declared the new HUD position a "vindication for Westchester County.")
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Dr. Ben Carson, the Trump administration HUD secretary,
earlier had condemned "government-engineered attempts to
legislate racial equality .... "292 However, in July 2017 Carson
resisted calls to rescind the AFFH rule, saying instead that
HUD would "reinterpret" it. 293 "I probably am not going to mess
with something the Supreme Court has weighed in
on [in Inclusive Communities]," Carson said, "[i]n terms of
interpreting what it means-that's where the concentration is
going to be." 294
1. Dignity

Human dignity is an important norm, but it is not well
defined. For present purposes, a good beginning is "the Kantian
injunction to treat every [person] as an end, not as a means." 295
More germane here, Professor Carol Rose recently explored the
extent to which devices such as racially restrictive covenants
running with the land, which were legally enforceable in the
United States during the first half of the last century, deprived
racial minorities of their dignity. 296 Furthermore, while the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has had an "immense"
impact in housing development, early on it equated
neighborhood stability with racial segregation, 297 and in many
ways its record with respect to the African-American
community has been "terrible." 298 "The FHA began redlining

292. Ben S. Carson, Experimenting With Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES,
July 23, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamashousingrules-try-to-accom plish-/.
293. Joseph Lawler & Al Weaver, Ben Carson: HUD Will "Reinterpret" Obama
Housing Discrimination Rule, WASH. EXAMINER, July 20, 2017, http://www.washington
examiner .com/ben-carson-hud-will-reinterpret-obama-housing-discriminationrule/article/2629178.
294. Id.
295. Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INTL. L.
848, 849 (1983) (adding that "[r]espect for the intrinsic worth of every person should
mean that individuals are not to be perceived or treated merely as instruments or
objects of the will of others").
296. See Carol M. Rose, Racially Restrictive Covenants-Were They Dignity
Takings?, 41 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 939 (2016).
297. See generally John Kimble, Insuring Inequality: The Role of the Federal
Housing Administration in the Urban Ghettoization of African Americans, 32 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 399 (2007). "If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that
properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes. A change
in social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a decline in
values." Id. at 405 (quoting 1938 FHA underwriting manual).
298. See David J. Reiss, The Federal Housing Administration and AfricanAmerican Homeownership), A.B.A. J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954157.
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African-American communities at its very beginning. Its later
days have been marred by high default and foreclosure rates in
those same communities."299
In present-day New York City, critics have assailed the
"poor door," a separate lobby for moderate-income units
required in luxury buildings as a condition of tax subsidies, "as
reminiscent of Jim Crow segregation and symbolic of the
increasing and perverse levels of economic inequality in our
cities." 300 Some elected officials have advocated legislation
providing that lower-income tenants admitted to an apartment
building through such considerations as the mandates of
government subsidy programs have access to the same
amenities as market-rate tenants. 301 The amenity-related
policies of landlords to which they object were characterized by
one state senator as a "form of apartheid," 302 and the recent
"poor door" controversy in Manhattan is a notable case in
point. 303
While dignity typically is regarded as a moral imperative, it
need not be instantiated in the level of housing amenities
one possesses. The philosopher Harry Frankfurt recently
distinguished between equality and sufficiency. 304 Along the
same lines, another philosopher, Michael Walzer, distinguished
between those spheres where it was important that all possess
the wherewithal for basic life activities (for example,
transportation) and those in which the market should govern
(for example, new luxury automobiles as opposed to well-worn
used cars). 305

299. Id.
300. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Incluswn, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 487, 530-31
(2017) (citing Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning's Contributwns to Both
Affordable Housing and Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 585, 595 (2015)).
301 See Corinne Lestch, Elected Officials Want to Ban 'Poor Doors' Approved by
Bloomberg Administration, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 26, 2014, http://www.nydaily
news.com/new-york/elected-officials-ban-poor-doors-approved-bloombergadministration-article-1.1880874 (noting demands for zoning change precluding the
practice).
302. Lauren C. Wittlin, Access Denied: The Tale of Two Tenants and Building
Amenities, 31 TOURO L. REV. 615, 616 (2015) (citation omitted).
303. See Mireya Navarro, "Poor Door" in a New York Tower Opens a Fight
Over Affordable Housing, N.Y. TlMES, Aug. 26, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com
/2014/08/27/nyregion/separate-entryways-for-new-york-condo-buyers-and-renterscreate-an-affordable-housing-dilemma.html?mcubz=O (discussing a proposed luxury
apartment building in which mandated affordable units would have a separate
entrance, lobby, and street address).
304. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON INEQUALITY (2015).
305. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 10-17 (1983).
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2. People or Places
There has been a lively debate as to whether government
programs to relieve poverty should be people-based or placebased. 306 This conventional bifurcation, according to Professor
Nestor Davidson, distinguishes between strategies to "invest in
individuals, often with the explicit goal of allowing those
individuals to move to a better life," and programs that "seek to
reinvigorate distressed neighborhoods." 307 This problem
pertains not only to distressed inner cities, but also to many
parts of rural America that suffer from "the decline of
manufacturing and farm consolidation." 308 However, "while lots
of struggling residents see leaving as the best way to improve
their lives, a surprising share remain stuck in place" because of
high home prices in prosperous cities, reliance on locally-based
social service networks and benefits, and cultural dissonance,
so that "they no longer believe they can leave."309
Davidson asserts that the Manichean nature of the "people
or places" debate presents an "unnecessary distraction," and
that "[e]very policy that seeks to alleviate individual poverty is
constrained by location and, if successful, alters communities.
Every policy that seeks to respond to the spatial concentration
of poverty works through individuals."310
From the perspective of Progressive Property, Professo.r
Ezra Rosser stated that "targeted interventions in the ordinary
workings of property law can be used to protect vulnerable
populations by changing the power dynamics of the market,"
and discussed strategies for doing so for people in a
"geographically defined space" (place-based) and "to particular
parties who have shared characteristics" (people-based), and
also a blend of strategies designed to achieve law reform. 311
Some
question
the
advantages
of infrastructure
expenditures in lagging communities. In discussing the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the land use economist

306. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and
Community Development Policy, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1 n.1 (2009) (citing
articles taking both positions). See also infra Part VI.B.
307. Davidson, supra note 306, at 1.
308. Janet
Adamy
&
Paul
Overberg,
Struggling Americans Once
Sought Greener Pastures-Now They're Stuck, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2017,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/struggling-americans-once-sought-greener-pasturesnowtheyre-stuck-1501686801.
309. Id.
310. Davidson, supra note 306, at 6.
311. Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 455--56 (2015).
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Edward Glaeser asked whether New Orleans residents would
be better off having $200,000 in their pockets or $200 billion
spent on city infrastructure, which would be unlikely to revive
its economy in any event. 312 He added that "there is a
big difference between rebuilding lives and rebuilding
communities. Given limited funds, the two objectives may well
conflict, and the usual lesson from economics is that people are
better off if they are given money and allowed to make their
own decisions, much as they are with car insurance." 313
In what might spark renewed interest in the "people or
places" debate, President Trump recently declared that "[w]hen
you have an area that just isn't working like upper New York
state . . . you can leave, it's OK, don't worry about your
house." 314 Programs that offer extensive tax credits to
companies creating jobs in upstate New York have been
"pushed" by Gov. Andrew Cuomo, but "[these] measures have
been criticized as "inefficient," and the state's population
decreased by 2,000 in the year ending in 2016.3 15

VI. TAKINGS AND EXACTIONS
Until about the time of the Civil War, American courts
regularly explained the power of eminent domain with
reference to natural law principles. 316 John Locke provided the
alternative explanation that, although the sovereign could not
appropriate private property, the conveyance of property for
public use could be done by the owner, or by the legislature
through its power delegated by the owner.317 In the U.S., the
Fifth Amendment provides, among other limitations on
government power, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." 318 This did not
constitute a new power of the federal government, but rather a
"tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take private
property for public use." 319 In 1875, in Kohl v. United States, 320

312. Edward L. Glaeser, Should the Government Rebuild New Orleans,
or Just Give Residents Checks?, THE ECONOMISTS' VOICE (Sept. 2005),
https://doi.org/10.2202/1553-3832. l 12 l.
313. Id at 2.
314. Mike Vilensky, Trump Remark Stings Upstate New York, Sparks Debate,
WALL ST. J., July 28, 2017, at A9A.
315. Id.
316. See J.A.C. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent
Domain, 6 WIS. L. REV. 67 (1931).
317. Locke, supra note 7, § 138.
318. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
319. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946).
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the Supreme Court declared that the eminent domain power "is
essential to [the U.S. government's] independent existence and
perpetuity." 321 Four years earlier, the Court made clear that
the duty to compensate did not require an affirmative
government appropriation of title, but could result from the
government's actions, such as the authorization of a dam that
would permanently flood private land upstream.3 22

In Pennsylvania Coal Co. u. Mahon, 323 Justice Holmes
famously declared: "The general rule at least is that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 324 There, a state
law had forbidden the company to mine seams of coal which
would provide support for private structures, although earlier
Mahon had purchased only surface rights and not the right of
support. 325 Holmes opinion is very cryptic, and is not explicitly
based either on the Takings Clause or on the company's right
to due process of law.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. u. City of New York, 326
the Supreme Court's most important regulatory takings case, it
evaluated a New York City historic preservation ordinance that
precluded the railroad from constructing an office building on
top of the architecturally acclaimed Grand Central Terminal.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, observed that defining
a taking "has proved to be a problem of considerable
difficulty."3 27 He declared:
[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop
any "set formula" for determining when "justice and
fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that
whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid
by the government's failure to pay for any losses

320. 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
321. Id. at 371.
322. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (private land permanently
flooded in course of building government-authorized dam).
323. 260 U. S. 393 (1922).
324. Id. at 415.
325. Id.
326. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
327. Id. at 123.
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proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the
particular circumstances [in that] case."328
Justice Brennan then added what has become known3 29 as
the three-factor Penn Central ad hoc balancing test:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries, the Court's decisions have identified several
factors that have particular significance. [1] The
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, [2] the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations
are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is [3] the
character of the governmental action. A "taking" may
more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good. 330
Since interference with "expectations" is a subset of "economic
impact," and since the Court's enumeration is only of factors
having "particular significance," there is no clear reason why a
three-factor analysis was employed. 331 In any event, there is
nothing talismanic about having three factors. 332
Later, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church,333
the Court added that a temporary regulation might
require compensation in an appropriate case, a proposition it
elaborated upon in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 334 There it declared that "we
do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction
precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize
that it should not be given exclusive significance one way or the

328. Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
329. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 546 (discussing an earlier holding
in which the Court had "applied the three-factor regulatory takings analysis set forth
in Penn Central'').
330. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted).
331. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Character of the Governmental Action, 36 VT. L.
REV. 649, 655 (2012) ("[T]he intellectual fashions of the day demanded three- and fourpart tests.").
332. See Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test,
118 PA. ST. L. REV. 601, 615--16 (2014) (discussing other enumerative schemes).
333. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
334. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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other." 335 The Court declared as well that Penn Central
remained its "polestar" in regulatory takings cases. 336
As I have elaborated upon elsewhere, the Penn Central
doctrine has two principal flaws. First, although conventionally
described as a three-factor test, as the brackets above indicate,
the duration of a regulation is just as important a factor as the
others. 337 Also the Penn Central doctrine "has become a
compilation of moving parts that are neither individually
coherent nor collectively compatible." 338 As Professor Gideon
Kanner added: "The vagueness and unpredictability of [Penn
Central's] rules, or more accurately the 'factors' deemed
significant by the Court which declined to formulate rules,
have encouraged regulators to pursue policies that have
sharply reduced the supply of housing and are implicated in
the ongoing, mind-boggling escalation in home prices." 339 That
said, some have found a virtue in Penn Central's vagueness. 340
Second, while the mechanics of Penn Central are ungainly,
the more fundamental problem is that it purports to be based
on the Takings Clause, whereas it fits better under the
rubric of substantive due process. 341 "Takings" refers to the
government's appropriation of property, for which the owner is
entitled to just compensation. "Burdens," on the other hand,
refers to the owner's deprivation, relative to the owner's overall
wealth. "Investment-backed expectations" even more explicitly
is concerned with the owner and not with the asset. 342
Armstrong, upon which Penn Central is predicated, states that
"justice and fairness" abjure disproportionate burdens of
government actions being placed on a few individuals. 343

Id. at 337.
Id. at 336.
See Eagle, supra note 332.
Id. at 602.
Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS J. 679, 681 (2005)
340. E.g., Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002).
341. See Steven J. Eagle, Penn Central and Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR L.
REV. 1 (2014); see also, Kenneth Salzberg, "Takings" as Due Process, or Due Process as
"Takings''?, 36 VALPARAISO U. L. R. 413 (2002) (Advocating use of due process analysis
in reviewing land use regulations); Peter A. Clodfelter & Edward J. Sullivan,
Substantive Due Process Through the Just Compensation Clause: Understanding
Koontz's "Special Application" of the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions by
Tracing the Doctrine's History, 46 URB. LAW. 569, 616--19 (2014) (asserting that Koontz
engages in a heightened substantive due process style of judicial review under the
guise of takings jurisprudence).
342. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
343. Id. at 123--24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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Pennsylvania Coal itself is much better viewed as a due
process case than as a takings case. 344 However, the Court's
conservative justices have been unwilling to look at
deprivations of land use through what they have regarded as
an unconstrained lens, 345 and its progressive justices have
viewed it in terms of the Court's pre-New Deal emphasis on
property and contract rights. 346 Takings law ought to refer to
the property taken, and not to, as Penn Central had it, the
"economic impact" upon the particular owner of that property,
nor that person's "expectations," nor the "character" of the
government's action (apart from whether it was arbitrary or
not for a public use).347
In practice, the Penn Central ad hoc, multi-factor balancing
test has not proved auspicious for property owners. For
instance, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which has
jurisdiction over takings claims against the federal
government, "generally has relied on value losses 'well in
excess of 85 percent' in finding takings." 348 As Professor Joseph
Singer notes, "It turns out that it is really hard to win a
regulatory takings claim."349
Penn Central's lack of definitiveness, together with the
flight from meaningful long-term planning, 350 seems suited to
produce a reign of bargaining and delay and an invitation to
arbitrary conduct, which fulfills neither adherence to the rule
of law nor the goal of an adequate supply of housing.
A. New Flavors of "Takings"
A permanent appropriation of private land for government
use, deemed a "physical taking," requires just compensation. 351
Likewise, restrictions on property that have the effect of

344. Eagle, supra note 341, at 25-27.
345. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (describing substantive due process as an "oxymoron").
346. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406-07 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (warning that due process-based compensation for takings of property had
an "obvious kinship" with Lochnerism).
347. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
348. Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOL. L.Q.
307, 335 (2007) (quoting Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 357 & n.32 (2006)
(collecting cases)).
349. Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 4 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
601, 606 (2015).
350. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
351. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-35 (1982)
(real property); Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S.Ct. 2419, 2426-27 (2015) (personal
property).
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"forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole"
may be deemed "regulatory takings" under Penn Central's
multi-factor, ad hoc, balancing test. 352 Restrictions that deprive
an owner of all economically viable use of land constitute
categorical regulatory takings since they do not require the
application of a balancing test.353
In addition to these familiar, judicially established
categories of compensable takings, new varieties have been
proposed. Professors Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky
have argued that physical and regulatory takings should be
augmented by the category of "derivative takings," 354 by which
they define as "a hybrid of their more familiar close cousins"
that occurs when a taking "diminishes the value of surrounding
property." 355 More recently, Bell and Parchomovsky have
proposed study of what might be styled a "Givings Clause."356
Under this rubric, parallel to their three categories of takings,
would be physical, regulatory, and derivative "givings." Those
might require compensation be paid from the recipient to the
government. 357
Justice Elena Kagan's dissenting opinion in Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Management District articulated fears that
increased Takings Clause liability would lead local
governments to grant development approvals that would create
negative externalities for the community. 358 In that event,
Professor Gregory Stein recently postulated, members of the
public should be able to sue for a "reverse exaction." 359 While
this kind of citizen lawsuit might be effective with respect to

352. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24 (1978) (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
353. See Lucas v. S.C .. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
354. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV.
277 (2001).
355. Id. at 280-81. Derivative takings:
resemble regulatory takings in that they reduce the value of property without
physically appropriating it. Yet, they are distinct from regulatory takings in
that they may arise as the result of a physical taking. And, unlike its cousins,
the derivative taking never appears alone; it must always be preceded by a
physical or regulatory taking.
Id. (footnote omitted).
356. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).
357. Id. at 564-7 4 (setting forth their taxonomy).
358. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority "casts a cloud on every decision by
every local government to require a person seeking a permit to pay or spend money").
359. Stein, supra note 136.
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egregious cases of cronyism or outright corruption, the overall
effect might be to empower local NIMBYs who simply do not
want change nearby.

B. Contemporary Takings Issues
1. Varied Views of Regulatory Takings

Professor Christopher Serkin recently advocated that the
Takings Clause does not merely provide property owners with
negative rights, but rather might be the basis for compensation
where government fails its affirmative duty to protect property,
perhaps for permitting "passive takings" with respect to sea
level rise. 360
On the other hand, Professor Hanoch Dagan asserted that
the "broad consensus" that the taking of private property
generally deserves compensation does not apply to regulatory
takings law. 361 There, "some progressive authors advocate a
regime that sanctions, indeed expects, significant c1v1c
sacrifices extending to all economically beneficial uses of one's
land. These authors perceive most government injuries to
private property as ordinary examples of the background risks
and opportunities assumed by property owners." 362
2. Simple Disregard of Property Rights
Sometimes, the intent of administrators and court seems to
be that state governments can reconfigure infrastructure more
inexpensively by disregarding property rights. A recent
example is Bay Point Properties, Inc. v. Mississippi
Transportation Commission. 363 There, the state supreme court
upheld the commission's determination that condemned land
should be valued as if it were subject to an apparently
abandoned highway easement, on the ground that state law
gave the highway department the power to prevent legal

360. Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State's Affirmative Duty to Protect
Property, 113 MICH. L REV. 345 (2014).
361. Hanoch Dagan, Eminent Domain and Regulatory Takings: Towards a Unified
Theory *4 (Oct. 31, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2861844.
362. Id. (footnote omitted).
363. 201 So.3d 1046 (Miss. 2016), petition for cert. docketed, Mar. 7, 2017,
No. 16-1077.
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abandonment as a matter of law. The dissenting justices
argued that this would violate the owner's right to just
compensation. 364
3. Government
"Whole Parcel"

Takings

of Less

(Or

More)

than

the

The archetypical takings case involves a parcel of land
appropriated by the government. Thus, common law property
and equity establish relationships of land to land, without any
need to focus on the identity of the individuals involved. 365
However, especially in government infrastructure projects such
as highway construction, less than a given owner's entire
parcel is taken, and condemnation might have significant
impacts on adjoining owners, as well.
Professors Bell and Parchomovsky recently have argued
that the practical difficulties in dealing with the burdens and
benefits of severance should lead to the affected owner having
the right to demand that the government entity engaging in an
"incomplete taking" be forced to acquire the owner's fee simple,
instead. 366 While good intentions lead to "severance damages"
when partial takings reduce the value of parts of the owner's
parcel that were not taken, a countervailing concern is the
benefits the owner derives from the project for which land is
taken, which might inure particularly to the owner ("special
benefits") or to the area generally. States have attempted to
take these factors into account in differing ways. 367
Another practical problem that affects land development
involves the "relevant parcel" with regard to which the
relationship between lot size and development rights, and also
government takings liability, is to be measured. In Penn
Central, the Supreme Court stated that: "In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this
Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole ...."368 Unfortunately, there is no definitive

364. See id. at 1059-160 (Kitchens, J., dissenting).
365. See Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the
Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549, 559 (2012).
366. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Incomplete Takings, COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming).
367. See generally NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8A.03 (3d ed. 2015)
(summarizing the different state and federal approaches to offsets).
368. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
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answer as to how the "relevant parcel" is determined. 369 The
Supreme Court's recent decision in Murr v. Wisconsin 370 held
that reasonable investment-backed expectations should be
taken into account in determining the relevant parcel to which
it and the other Penn Central factors should be applied. 371 The
principal dissent, by Chief Justice Roberts, stressed that "in all
but the most exceptional circumstances," the boundaries of
deeded parcels should "determine the parcel at issue," and that
"[c]ramming [the Penn Central factors] into the definition of
'private property' undermines the effectiveness of the Takings
Clause as a check on the government's power to shift the cost of
public life onto private individuals." 372 A separate dissent by
Justice Thomas emphasized that the Takings Clause was not
deemed to encompass "regulatory takings" before Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon in 1922, and that "it would be desirable for
us to take a fresh look at our regulatory takings jurisprudence,
to see whether it can be grounded in the original public
meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 37 3

VII. REGULATION, HOUSING PRICES, AND PROSPERITY
A. Regulation and High Housing Prices

A classic example of good intentions producing bad results
is the tendency of regulations promulgated to provide better
housing instead resulting in less housing and less affordability.
California, particularly in its coastal cities, is facing a housing
affordability crisis. "Median rents across the state have
increased 24 percent since 2000, while at the same time
median renter household incomes have declined 7 percent." 374
While these rising rents result from a number of factors:

369. See generally Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel, 25 U. HAW.
L. REV. 353 (2003).
370. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (considering whether the statutory merger of two
contiguous parcels under the same ownership constituted a regulatory taking).
371. Id. at 1945, 1949.
372. Id. at 1953-54 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Thomas and Alito, JJ.).
373. Id. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922)).
374. Cal. Rous. P'ship Corp., Confronting California's Rent and Poverty Crisis:
A Call for State Reinvestment in Affordable Homes, (2016), https://www.issuelab.org/
resource/confronting-california-s-rent-and-poverty-crisis-a-call-for-state-reinvestmentin-affordable-homes.html.
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[I]t is clear that supply matters, and there is an urgent
need to expand supply in equitable and environmentally
sustainable ways. Over the past three decades,
California has added only about half the number of
units it needs to keep housing costs in line with the rest
of the United States. 375
Overly stringent land use regulations account for much of this
problem. 376

B. Residential Mobility and National Prosperity
The issue of whether government should provide benefits to
people or places, discussed earlier, 377 has broad implications for
regional and national prosperity. From a macroeconomics
perspective, Professor David Schleicher recently has asserted
that people are "stuck" in place because state and local
governments have created a "huge number of legal barriers to
inter-state mobility," including land use laws, differing
homeownership subsidies, and differing eligibility standards
for public benefits. 378 Those collectively limit exit areas with
less opportunity. He added that "public policies developed by
state and local governments more interested in local
population stability than in ensuring successful macroeconomic
conditions." 379
Those concerns are very much in line with the recent work
of economists Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti, who point
out that regional and national prosperity is enhanced by
workers moving to areas where agglomeration would facilitate
their higher productivity. 380 However, they might be
discouraged from doing so, because the lower pay in cities
where they would add less value to the economy would be more
than offset by the lower housing prices there. 381

375. Carolina K. Reid et al., Addressing California's Housing Slwrtage: Lessons
from Massachusetts Chapter 40B, 25 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 241, 241
(2017) (footnote omitted).
376. See Edward Glaeser, Land Use Restrictions and Other Barriers to
Growth, CATO INST. (2014), https://www.cato.org/publications/cato-online-forum/landuse-restrictions-other-barriers-growth.
377. See supra Part IV.B.2.
378. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stability,
127 YALE L.J. *l(forthcoming).
379. Id. at *l.
380. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial
Misallocation, (May 18, 2017), http://eml.berkeley.edu//-moretti/growth.pdf.
381. Id. at 1-3.
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CONCLUSION

The law of land use planning is marked with good
intentions, from the faith of the original Progressives in
objective and expert administration, through landownercentered wariness of regulation of supporters of property
rights, to the social-democratic views of the Progressive
Property advocates. Yet none have created a substantive
framework for regulation that receives general acclaim or even
general support. Economic prosperity brings dislocation and
inequality. Preserving community inherently is unwelcoming
to substantial numbers of outsiders. Affordable housing is fine
in the abstract, but different socio-economic groups have very
different understandings of how it should work and whom it
should benefit.
Likewise, legal mechanisms for policing the boundary
between private property rights and permissible government
regulation, most notably the Supreme Court's Penn Central
doctrine, largely leave public officials and judges to their own
devices. In the absence of any unifying v1s10n, the
particularities of time and place transcend earlier notions of
expert long-term planning. Local officials often have imposed
ponderous regulatory schemes that inhibit the production of
housing and sometimes try to leverage the police power
through public-private partnerships that are apt to benefit
private participants more than the public.
The American public generally has good intentions, but in
the absence of serious debate that might lead to the formation
of coherent aspirations and goals based on the discrete needs of
various segments of the population and also of places, land use
regulation cannot be do other than reflect disarray.

